"Bill Haponski" <haponski@seacove.net> was a former S3 and XO of the Blackhorse when he assumed command of the 1/4 Cav in the Spring of 1969.  He wrote: 

Atlas Wedge, Day 13, 31 March 1969

Fighting on the preceding day had been fierce. D (Air) and I had received ground fire when we went down to treetop level in areas beyond the B and C Troop contacts, and it was obvious our ground elements were engaging only a portion of the total force in the Michelin -- but probably the largest contingent. Fighting continued until 1600 when the ARPs were inserted for the last time and made contact. The log indicates that B Troop may have had some sporadic contact after that up to dark as they were finding more bodies and equipment. It had been a long day. In fact, Charlie Troop had had RPGs and AKs fired at it in its RON at 0342, four hours before it was in contact at the AVLB site. Not counting Charlie Troop's early wake up call, we had fought for 11 hours on the 30th. We used all the light we could get too continue our sweep, then we RONed. Bravo Troop was at the enemy base camp on the west bank of the stream near where the aborted AVLB crossing had occurred. Charlie troop was also on the stream but 2 km farther south, and about 2km due west of Doc.

The role of D Company 1-11 ACR is unclear to me after I passed B Troop through them, and we have precious little original material to clarify the situation.

This is what might have happened. Delta had joined us only the evening before, after what I think was a long road march and maybe maintenance problems. I believe that at some point another tank platoon was attached to them from B/2-34 Armor, thereby giving the company (-) a third tank platoon. They may also have had an infantry platoon attached. After they started their attack on line and were hit with RPGs, I conferred with their commander and decided to use them in two roles - as a blocking force to protect B and C Troop on the north while those troops maneuvered, and as a reserve. The log notes nothing further of D Company until 1730 when they request resupply of 150 cannister rounds and a water trailer. At 1756 the company commander reports he is checking out of our net. When RON locations are later entered into the log, B and C Troops in the rubber and A/2-28 at Doc are accounted for, but D Company is not mentioned. Hopefully some of the Delta troopers can remember and we can recover original material which will shed light on D Company's role. One their troopers (Glenn Aston^editor) was killed and one (Roy Anklam^editor) wounded during the attack. Captain Wyse, their commander, died some years ago.

After dark we summarize reports from the various units: 60 enemy KIA, 1 POW, 1 Chieu Hoi; significant numbers of weapons and ammunition captured. Vehicle combat losses were 1 tank from D/1-11, one from B/1-4 Cav, and one ACAV from B Troop. ( I think there were more, but they are not recorded.) A Charlie Troop tank also is listed as CBL, perhaps as a result of the grenade accident Doc McGeady reported. These vehicles and others which were inoperable were all dragged into FSB Doc. The log says we are told, "All CBL's cannot be confirmed until a personnel from Ordnance checks it out." Just before midnight I am told I will have D Troop (Air) (-) opcon to us again the next day, the 31st.

In the morning, after we receive resupply at RON positions, B Troop sweeps south through the battlefield of the preceding day and beyond while Charlie RIFs north through it, then both join and sweep south with Charlie on the right, Bravo on the left. Beginning at 0814 and throughout the day we spot a few NVA. At 0825 we are told that a Super Hook will be flying out to Doc at noon to pick up the bulldozer, and that a replacement tank for D Company 1-11 ACR will be arriving at Doc at 0930. (1st Division, how about some vehicles for 1-4 Cav? Probably Ordnance is still trying to decide if we had combat losses.)

Apparently based on what we see from the air we put in an artillery prep and C and B Troops resumes the sweep. We continue to find bodies and caches from the previous day's contact. At 1059, apparently the CG lands to see me at the B Troop RON position. At 1116 Brigade tells us that M Company, 3-11 ACR will become opcon to us when he reaches Doc. We lose D/1-11 and plt B/2-34 at this time. B Troop picks up 4 Chieu Hoi's and say they will exploit the intelligence they get from them and then evacuate them. (We always tried to find out quickly what POWs and Chieu Hoi's knew, and they usually were perfectly willing - even eager - to tell us. As a rule, they did not have the loyalty to their comrades that US soldiers do when captured.)

At 1315 D/1-11 reports closing on Doc. (Apparently they RONed somewhere nearby the preceding evening but not under my command - strange!) At 1525 I update the body count for the two days at 76, 3 of which are killed by air, and 5 POWs. I am told that M Company 3-11 ACR is closing Doc at this time. Two hours later they have hit a mine 1 km west of Doc, just into the Michelin. Apparently I had planned to use them right away in the rubber. There were no casualties, and the vehicle is towed back to Doc. At 1750 we lose our engineer sweep team which is extracted from Doc. The three units RON, with Charlie 5 km deep into the plantation where they had been sweeping, Bravo 2 km away from Charlie and still in the enemy base camp area, and M Company 2 km west of Doc. Just before midnight, B Troop sends in an impressive tally of the day's weapons caches. Although the log does not record it, at some point before midnight we report the total NVA confirmed body count during the two days as 90 with 6 POWs.

I do not know how to account for having D/1-11 for such a short time and then receiving M/3-11 as its replacement. Hopefully the future logs will help me remember.