"Bill Haponski" <haponski@seacove.net> was a former S3 and XO of the Blackhorse when he assumed command of the 1/4 Cav in the Spring of 1969.  He wrote: 


Correction: The platoon of B/2-34 Armor appears to have had no role in this attack unless it is attached to D/1-11. Also, C/1-4 appears to have had an engineer squad attached for some time, at least since 25 Mar. [Check sources.]

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Atlas Wedge, Day 13, Attack into Michelin, 30 March 1969

Task organization unchanged: B, C, D (Air)(-) Troops 1-4 Cav; D Company (tank) 1-11 ACR. Each ground unit continues to have 1 infantry platoon attached. A/2-28 remains vic Doc as security and does not participate in the attack.

The Division after action report states: "Contact in the area of operation after the enemy attack on FSB Doc on the 28th] was negligible again until 30 Mar when TF Haponski engaged in one of the most significant contacts of Atlas Wedge."

This is an understatement. Our battle was not only the single largest battle of Atlas Wedge with more of both friendly and enemy KIA than any other, but was the biggest fight in all of Vietnam on this day.

I have spent a great deal of time in the last two days trying to match log reports, map coordinates, and other original sources in an attempt to present a coherent commentary. Too many items remain to be checked. Rather than do my usual daily commentary based primarily on the S-3 logs, I am going to wait until I can draw all of this information together for a definitive treatment.
Following are some original sources which present the attack from different points of view.

From my journal, 17 April 1969:

The battle of FSB Doc had ended.

But this was not to be the worst.. That came on the morning of the 30th when we dashed into the Michelin, head on into a battalion of 500-600. They were tough bastards, the kind who stood up to tanks and ACAV's with their RPG's. Their first rounds did all the damage. Twelve of my men were dead within minutes. My mouth was dry and I felt sick to my stomach, but had to endure. We fought the battle all day, and in a lesser fashion the next day. When it was done, ninety enemy bodies lay under the trees and six prisoners had been taken. The air strikes and artillery and gunships that I put in undoubtedly killed many more, but darkness fell before we could sweep the whole battlefield. That night, late, in the quietness of the rubber I thought of over one hundred men dead. I, and I alone, had the full responsibility. Exhausted, heart-sick, I slept until dawn.

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I tasked the medical platoon to move with C Troop, the lead element initially in the attack.

From the journal of our squadron surgeon, Steve McGeady:

30 March. Palm Sunday. The day Christ rode an ass into Jerusalem to be hailed king, we rode iron horses into the Michelin to trap the NVA. The big strategy was that we would surprise the enemy by using an AVLB. The NVA were very smart the way they set up his base camp. Always it was near a creek or ditch that armor couldn't cross & often BD of the camp occupied either side of the natural barrier. In one such area we had to go north about 2 clicks cross & come back to get to the base camp. The Col wanted to put the AVLB across at the base camp & Charlie would find us in his lap before he knew what had happened. At 0600 we left Doc & were in Michelin by 0700. The AVLB was moving toward the launch site & a mine sweep team was out in front clearing the path when suddenly the NVA began to pull out across the stream about 200 m into the rubber & they began moving north across the road. One of the Big Boys fired an HE round & we saw it impact over in the rubber. Suddenly they called for a medic. Nobody knew what had happened. When I got there the 5 men on the mine sweep team were lying in the trail. I ran from one to the other seeing how badly they were hurt. The first lay still with his eyes closed; there were 2 ragged holes in his chest heart high & his eyes were glassy with dilated pupils. The stethoscope told me for sure what I already knew, and I moved quickly to the next man. The next 2 were leg wounds & not very bad & the 4th just a superficial scratch on the lower back. I went back & was working on the leg wounds, not realizing that another man had been hit. Finally I saw him & ran up almost to the little bridge. I didn't even use a stethoscope on him. The wound was the same as the first & the result was too. A claymore. The NVA had picked this spot right at the bridge where everyone had to funnel together. Just like a big shotgun it sprayed the trail with whatever they'd loaded into it. A single shot fired, time 0750 & already 2 GI's dead. We called a Dustoff for the wounded & put the bodies into bags. The boy by the bridge's friend was furious. Two days he's been here from A Troop. 2 days. He's 21 years old today. That man was 21 years old today. I slapped his shoulder & said come on we've got work to do. I knew it'd be a long day. We went North now, the AVLB plan now scrapped. We crossed the stream and raced West in 2 column sweep, hoping to box in the NVA who were moving North on 3 sides & force them to fight. Down the rows of rubber you could see glimpses of the enemy soldiers running now East, now South. They were too far off to engage sowe contented ourselves with forming a blocking force. The NVA trying to escape East ran smack into M Co. 3/11's tanks & were turned back [actually D Co 1-11]. Next they tried to go North, & ran into B Trp. which was sweeping South like us. Next they just holed up in bunkers & fought. When B's sweep reached them they were ready & opened up with RPG & RR. We held in a line
since B couldn't advance but finally after nearly an hour we wheeled ourline about so we were facing East & moved ahead hoping to flank the bunkers without getting into Bravo's line of fire. We were moving ahead & "reconning" by fire as we went. All the bunkers we encountered were reconned with .50 cal. & grenades thrown in. They were app. empty. Then came C55's voice, "All right everybody down they're bringing in air strikes. B's getting the shit kicked out of them." We crouched into the belly of the ACAV. God it was hot, & the sweat just rolled off us & soaked thru our fatigues. The jets rolled in in criss cross patterns & dropped their ordnance or fired their 20 mm cannons. For 40 min. they pounded away at the middle of the 3 sided box we'd formed. We kept one man up to make sure the NVA didn't slip up on us but even he ducked when the jets came in. Finally it was over & again we moved ahead as before slowly but steadily. Novem. called for a dustoff, but not for me. No reason given. So we moved along. Finally about 1230 we came to a clearing & stopped. The troop continued to check bunkers & throw grenades in. One tank driver threw an armed grenade but his hand hit the tank's gun & the grenade fell into the cockpit with him. He tried to find it for a moment then realizing his plight began to scream & scramble trying to get out of the tank. He didn't make it. There was a muffled "Thump" & they called for a medic. The sweet acrid odor of high explosives mixed with that of blood hung around the man's torn body. This was the most needless death of all. We took the body to a central collection point near where Bravo had had the heavy contact & only then did I realize how badly Bravo had been hit. Three vehicles were in flames. One tank & a pair of ACAV's. One ACAV had a huge crater in the front which could only have meant a RR. I didn't hold much hope for the driver of this vehicle. I learned that they'd had 7 KIA & a dozen dusted off mostly with slight injuries or nervous exhaustion. By now it was over. The NVA were completely demoralized & it was just like slaughtering sheep. Our men would creep up to a bunker & peer in, recoil in horror at the sight of 1-2 NVA sitting inside & hurl a grenade in. The NVA made no attempt to fight or escape & were killed in 1-2 grps throughout the rest of the afternoon. We had [account ends abruptly, no continuation].

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I have clues in the logs as to Hq command section's involvement, but need to check further. What is clear is that the section was heavily engaged on at least one occasion. I was not with them, but was in the air [in a LOH, of all things. Why Division could not give me a proper C & C ship for control of their main event of the day, which they had been anticipating for five days, I will never know. Perhaps it was needed for a PX run.]

One aspect that does not come through well in the interviews that follow is the important role played by D (Air). I had much of the troop under my command that day, to include light fire teams and the aero rifle platoon which I inserted soon after first contact.


17th MILITARY HISTORY DETACHMENT
1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96345

ABDB-T (MHD)
19 April 1969

SUBJECT: Combat After Action Interview Report: Operation Atlas Wedge - 18 Mar - 2 Apr 69 (U)

[Not included here are 11 pages of task organization, intelligence, execution, lessons learned, and other items. Appendices include 4 interviews, two of which are with LTC Haponski and CPT Selsor. The majority of the interviews are included below.]

INTERVIEWEE: LTC William C. Haponski, CO, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, 1st Infantry Division.

INTERVIEWER: MAJ William W. Campion, CO, 1th Military History Detachment, 1st Infantry Division.

CAMPION: This combat after action interview report is being conducted with LTC William C. Haponski, Commanding Officer, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, 1st Infantry Division, on 8 April 1969, at Lai Khe, Republic of Vietnam. LTC Haponski assumed command of the Squadron on 5 January 1969. The interview concerns the participation of his unit in operation Atlas Wedge during the period 18 March to 2 April 1969.

[Two pages omitted describing events to 30 March.]

HAPONSKI: On the 29th we conducted RIFs locally and on the 30th went back into the Michelin. The plan was to put down an AVLB in the southern edge of my area of operations and to sweep north. However, in moving the AVLB into position at first light, we made a contact with a sizable force. It was at least a platoon, and the report was that they were fleeing north. In the fire fight three of my men were killed and additional ones were wounded. Since the report was that they were going north, I immediately discontinued putting the AVLB in and sent one Troop to the north on the eastern side of a stream in an attempt to cut the fleeing NVA off, and in fact it turned out that they did just this. They hooked into them as [the troop] made a western move and immediately came under fire and returned fire on both sides of the column to the north and to the south. My feeling was that the major portion of the enemy was still to the south of them after having outraced them to the north. Consequently I turned the Troop to the south on line, brought my Delta Company of the 11th Cav in, and turned them on line. Thus with Charlie Company of the 1-4 Cav and Delta of the 1-11 Cav on line, we began our sweep south. Bravo Troop at this time had been sweeping to the north on the eastern side of the stream, and I brought them into a position just to the rear of the two southern sweeping elements. We had barely begun the sweep when Delta Company was hit by heavy RPG fire and small arms fire. In this engagement one tank was knocked out, and one man was killed. I received the report again that large numbers of the enemy were fleeing to the south, and I therefore echeloned Charlie Troop facing generally south but with their right flank further extended than the left in an attempt to form a block as I moved Bravo Troop through the Delta Company which had sustained the casualties and, in my opinion, was not ready to press on with the fight. Bravo Troop passed through Delta Company, and by this time I had closed two sides of a square: Charlie Troop facing east, forming a block and engaging the enemy as they fled south, Bravo Troop passing through Delta Company and going to the south across the front of the block. Bravo Troop went through with all weapons firing, putting out an amazing volume of fire as a Cavalry Troop can, and yet they ran into a second screen of NVA RPG men, a very strong screen, and this screen hit three of their vehicles and caused severe casualties. The total killed for Bravo Troop in those three vehicles was eight. Bravo Troop, however, did continue to press the attack after pulling back to reorganize. And when Bravo Troop hit this second line of RPG men, I had my first set of fighters on station and began putting in sets of fighters - I believe the total was six - into the box that was formed by Bravo Troop on the north, Charlie Troop on the west , and the open stream on the east. The only flank that was not covered by forces or by Air Cavalry screening was the south, and we were putting the air strikes in that area in the box to the south and artillery across the south. As a matter of interest, one of the prisoners whom we captured the next day who had been wounded - we captured four of them down to the south - one of them indicated about 60, he thought, had managed to flee south, many of them wounded. His group of ten then split up into a smaller group of four and the disruption was caused in fact by the artillery and the gun ships and the air strikes that were put into the south. So apparently large numbers of casualties were inflicted on the fleeing enemy by the blocking fires. I swept Charlie troop across the contact area to the east. We did not take time to pick up weapons or count casualties or anything like this. They merely grenaded bunkers as they went and went all the way across in front of Bravo Troop. Then Bravo Troop was brought down to the south grenading bunkers and pulling out the dead NVA, collecting weapons and equipment. Unfortunately my time ran out, and it got dark before we were able to complete our sweep through this complex. Therefore I feel that the total body count in the two days of operations of 90 killed and 6 captured was only a portion of the body count that we would have gotten had we not run out of daylight. As a matter of fact, for the next two days as we were sweeping the area we found areas where NVA had been buried, where they had been dragged off, and many blood trails going off in all directions from the area of contact. Our feeling is, based on the intelligence that we gathered from this contact, that we hit squarely into at least one NVA rifle company and one artillery company from the 7th NVA Division. With a total body count of 90 and 6 PWs, it is obvious that those two companies at least are now combat ineffective. The operations after the 30th of March and for the next three days until the 2nd of April, while we remained in the Michelin, were sweeps, destruction of bunkers, finding of more equipment, poking into as many possible areas as we could to develop the situation. But we had no more enemy contact after the 31st. I believe I mentioned earlier that on the second day of the operation we did in fact kill four and capture four.

CAMPION: Sir, another question here. How do you view these operations in the rubber plantation, the Michelin Plantation, recalling the area which is more routine for your operations in the vicinity of Di An - Phu Loi? In other words, how do you look at the Michelin Plantation as an area of operation for armor?

HAPONSKI: Unquestionably the Michelin and areas like this are where the 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, should be in terms of Division resources in my opinion. We can operate in the Plantation with no problem whatsoever. We can bring our massive firepower to bear, and we can maneuver. Of course we can do the same thing in the Di An area and in the Phu Loi area, but we
don't find major NVA forces down there, and we find ourselves doing such things as poking around back yards with sticks to try to find a tunnel or two. This has a deleterious effect on the units after awhile. They don't get to feel that they are operating as Cavalry classically can operate. So we look upon the Michelin operation as a challenge. It was the first major engagement for this squadron since last fall when the Squadron went north to the An Loc - Loc Ninh area, again in the rubber, and scored very well. For Charlie Troop it was the first major engagement since May of last year. All the people are new; all of the people were inexperienced. Charlie Troop in the Di An area hadn't even had a small contact. Bravo Troop had a few small contacts in the Di An area, but as a whole we must say that the 30th of March - or I suppose we could say the 28th of March - the attack on the Fire Support Base - and the 30th of March in the rubber, were the first real tests for this Squadron in a long time. I am pleased with the opportunity to be able to operate in this area. The unit morale is high; the troops like it. For one thing it is cool under the trees in the rubber. They can operate, and they feel that they are doing the job that the Cavalry can do. I especially like to operate with my Delta Air Troop in the rubber and around the fringes of the rubber with the whole Squadron conducting sweeps and gaining intelligence as the classical Cavalry Squadron is designed to do.

CAMPION: Sir, as a closing question to this interview, did you or your unit bring away from the operation any pertinent lessons learned?

HAPONSKI: We most certainly did. One of the lessons that we learned was the importance of accurate reporting. I am convinced in my mind that we sustained some casualties because of erroneous reports, or incomplete reports perhaps I should say. There were reports given in the heat of battle which a more seasoned unit perhaps would not have given. I am thinking specifically of the report that the enemy was fleeing south which was given to me and which was my reason for passing Bravo Troop without waiting for an artillery preparation in the area. Of course with enemy units fleeing south in droves as they were reported, and with the massive firepower of the Cavalry, the thing to do in my mind is to pursue, and this is what we did. However, what was not reported was that the enemy apparently was in bunkers which were unknown to us and that they in fact had an extensive RPG screen and this is what caused the casualties when Bravo Troop passed through. The casualties that Delta sustained were no more than casualties normally sustained in a combat or a fleeting combat of this nature. But the ones that were sustained were definitely from troops that were well entrenched in bunkers- well-disciplined troops and those that would stand up in the face of canister rounds, 50 caliber, small arms fire delivered at them by the Cavalry Troop as it progressed. And had I had a more accurate report, if it could have been given by my subordinate commanders at that time, we would have held up for the artillery preparation in that particular area. As it was, I put my air in, but my air was south of the point of heaviest contact due to the obvious requirement to keep the impact away from the friendly troops. That is one lesson we learned, the absolute necessity of accurate reporting even in the heat of battle.

Another lesson is in reference to operating in the rubber. Generally speaking, as I said, we can maneuver very well in the rubber. However, in the Michelin you can maneuver very well in only one direction and that is north and south. You can maneuver fairly well in the east-west direction, and you can't maneuver at all if you are going across the grain of the rubber. The Michelin from the air looks nice and clean, as if you ought to be able to drive down these roads with no problem. But in fact, due to artillery, air strikes, and natural causes, these lanes are clogged in many cases with trees. There are bunkers in them. There are huge ant hills which have to be bypassed. So it is not just a question of getting on line and sweeping through a rubber plantation. You have to maneuver in the Plantation, and you have to plan your maneuver in this particular case so that you go north - south or east - west and not in one of the diagonal directions. The streams play an important role in the Michelin. They can be both a hindrance and a help. They are a help in that they provide good control features, they provide avenues where you can place your artillery and your air, and effectively block. And of course they also block your movement. An AVLB is absolutely necessary for operation in this area. In fact you must have two of them in case one malfunctions. The AVLB itselfis not adaptable to being pushed through the trees, so that you have to plan your approaches to your stream crossings carefully and you must have good engineer support with you at all times.

Another lesson that we learned is that you take time to blow bunkers if at all possible. We did this when we first went into the Michelin on the 22nd, but we were called out to allow the Michelin to fill up with NVA forces and to go back in on the 30th which was, in fact, what happened. But in pulling out early, we were unable to destroy many bunkers, and these bunkers that we
did not destroy, that we in fact did not even locate, were the ones that caused Bravo Troop the casualties in that short and fierce engagement. We know that you must destroy these bunkers. They are fairly easy to build again - true - but nevertheless if you are going back in in a hurry, these bunkers at least will not be ones that the NVA are fighting from.

About the only other lesson I can think of that we learned is that the artillery employment in the Plantation is as imperative as it is anywhere. The rubber trees are easy to see through relatively by a LOH flying at treetop level. And in this respect the Air Cavalry is invaluable because they can count the bunkers and they can mark the bunkers very easily. It is not like in the jungle area were you have a dense canopy. The LOH down in the treetops [in rubber] can in fact spot these bunkers and can spot active base camps. The Cavalry should be employed with its Air Cavalry Troop in rubber plantations, and it should be prepared to use all the artillery and air as in any engagement that it possibly can.

END OF INTERVIEW, HAPONSKI

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INTERVIEWEE: Captain James L. Selsor, Commanding Officer, Troop C, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, 1st Infantry Division.

INTERVIEWER: Major William W. Campion, Commanding Officer, 17th Military History Detachment, 1st Infantry Division.

CAMPION: This combat after action interview is being conducted with CPT James L. Selsor, Commanding Officer, Troop C, 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry, of the 1st Infantry Division at Lai Khe, Republic of Vietnam, on the 8th of April, 1969. The interview concerns the participation of his unit in Operation Atlas Wedge with particular emphasis placed on the period of 30-31 March 1969, during which time his unit engaged in one of the heavier contacts of the 1-4 Cav in this operation. CPT Selsor, I wonder if you could give us a narrative description of your observations of the activities on the 30th and 31st of March? These are the days of heaviest contact for your unit.

SELSOR: We had been in the Michelin about four days before we went into this operation, and the days we had been in there we had had small contact with a total of 5 NVA [KIA]. It was finally decided that these were recon forces so the concept was to pull back into Doc, pull everybody out of the Michelin in the hopes that we would get a main force in there. We pulled out for  total of about three days I believe it was. The concept of the operation for that morning when we left was for my troop to lead, and I had two AVLBs with me. There was one creek running before you actually get into the rubber where we had to launch the bridge to get across. We were then to go into the Michelin, and there are natural barriers there. There is a stream that runs north and south which splits our AO of the Michelin in half. Befo re when we operated in there, we had to go farther north to get across the creek. We had to go quite far north into our AO in order to get across the creek and then sweep south in this area where we had found base camps. The concept that morning was to launch a bridge, an AVLB, across the creek at a southern point, go across it, and then get on line and sweep north up through the base camp area. We left at 0545 in the morning. We had the first bridge in place by 0630. We had gone across that with no incidents. We had cut up through the rubber and cut up to the place where we planned to put the AVLB in. We were still in column. I was in column with three platoons in column and my troop headquarters behind the 1st platoon. The third platoon was leading, and the third platoon leader had the AVLB with him.

CAMPION: I wonder if I could interject a question here and ask you to give me a general statement or two about what other troops or elements of the task force were doing simultaneously with your movement in column.

SELSOR: The Squadron had Bravo Troop and also had Delta Troop from the 1-11 ACR which was the tank company. Bravo was supposed to sweep north on the east side of the stream. We were crossing over to the west side. Bravo was supposed to sweep north on the eastern side. The tank company was supposed to follow me across, and they were to be part of my right flank and sweep north with me. So they were right behind me in the column of march. We reached the second AVLB site, and the platoon had pulled up, and they had their squad of engineers with them who had dismounted and started to sweep the road with security forces of their own There were about six men on the ground with a tank right behind them on the road. The AVLB was directly behind them, and the tank was behind that as security. As we started to approach the creek, the platoon started to see people running through the woods. The first report that we got was that there were three NVA running north through the woods, and they were loaded with RPGs was the way it came across the air. I reported it to the Squadron, and we were told to engage them. So we started to engage them with 50 caliber and the main gun of the tank with HE rounds because we were about 300 to 500 meters away from the wood line, which would make a good shot with HE rounds. Just about the time the exchange of fire began, an RPG or claymore exploded down by the bridge site killing two of my men that were down there securing the engineers and wounded two of the engineers. At the time of the contact, we pulled the third platoon on line facing west. There was a clearing across the creek. We were parallel to the creek and on the opposite side of it shooting across the clearing into the wood line - shooting at the NVA running north. We had the wounded and the two KIAs laying on the ground in front of the AVLB. We went up and tried to see whether we could still launch the AVLB across the site and determined that it was impossible, that the gap was too wide for the AVLB to span. So we continued to deploy north. We had an alternate plan in case the AVLB couldn't be launched there. We had an alternate plan where we would go further north and cross at our normal crossing, get on line, and sweep south. I'd be on the western flank, and the tank company would be on my left on the eastern flank sweeping south. This was basically the plan that we used. We moved up north, changed our formation into a double column formation for added security since we had already had a little bit of contact. We went up to our normal crossing site and started sweeping west. We swept straight west in a double column formation. As we got further west, we were about 300 meters beyond the stream where the grain of the rubber makes it impossible to keep a double column formation, before we got on line. As we were getting to the point where we were going to go on line and start sweeping south, I started receiving fire from both sides of the road or trail that we were on - a trail that moves through the rubber. We engaged at that time, deploying into a herring-bone formation so we could bring fire to both sides of the road. A herring-bone formation is where the tracks just alternate the direction that they are facing. We were all in column facing in one direction, and when we herring-bone, one track turns to the left and the other turns to the right. This way they can bring their 50 calibers, their 7.62 machine guns, and also main guns to fire in opposite directions. It gives you all around security. After the contact subsided, we couldn't actually see whether we had inflicted any casualties at all. We took no casualties. We got on line heading south, and the tank company came up behind us, and they got on line heading south so at this time they were on my left flank. The forces we saw running through the woods before we had turned across the creek were about a platoon size. Finally we had seen almost twenty to thirty people running through the wood heading north. When we turned west, I believe we actually cut them in half. That is why we received fire from both sides. I think we were engaged probably with no more than a squad, but we cut them in half, and that is why they had to fight, and they really did not want to engage us at that time. I had previously neglected to state that when we moved out from our AVLB site -we had left that, deciding we couldn't launch the AVLB - and we were moving north paralleling the creek, the main unit or the lead unit, the 3rd platoon, spotted 3 NVA in a creek bed running and crouching in the creek bed running north. We engaged them with a canister round from the main gun killing two of them. The third one got away in the creek bed because we could not get down in there with one of our vehicles. We never did find him. We crossed the creek and, as I said, we were on line heading south. We had gone about 200 to 500 meters south when the left flank, the tank company, was engaged. All I know of that contact is what I heard over the radio. I never actually saw the contact. From what I heard over the radio, the tank company on my left was starting to take heavy RPG rounds. And initially they had one killed and one tank knocked out, and they held in place. In fact I think they backed off a little bit after they got the wounded out. They backed up about 50 meters. I held in place, but we were delayed in holding in place. We were sort of echeloned. We were ahead of them, maybe up to a hundred meters ahead of them, and I was echeloned back to link up with them. We stayed in place for about an hour and a half. We never actually had any contact during this time except that my left flank element, which was my 3rd platoon, could see people running through the woods. They would give me periodic reports that they could see five people, ten people, anywhere up to twenty people. I think we counted a total of sixty people running through the woods who they engaged with their 50 caliber. These people were 600 meters away that we were shooting at so we never knew whether we were hitting them or not, but we were putting fire down that way directly to the south. This contact was taking place about nine o'clock. I believe it was that time because I remember looking at my watch when we were starting to put the AVLB in when we had our first initial contact and that was about 0730. And it would have taken us an hour and a half to get to the position that we were in, maybe a little longer. But it was nine o'clock - ten o'clock, somewhere around in there. While we were in position, they were bringing in artillery and light gun ships to the area to our front on these people we saw running away and also close [air] support. And I could hear the Squadron Commander maneuvering Bravo Troop which had been sweeping north. He was swinging them around to cross the creek, and his plan was to pass them through the tank company and continue our sweep to the south. As Bravo Troop came on line, they were still getting close support from the gun ships, and I believe the Tac Air had started in about that time also so we had Tac Air support. Bravo Troop broke through the tank company, or passed through the tank company, and from what I could hear, they hadn't gone more than fifty meters - they were firing with everything they had - before they were also engaged with heavy RPGs and small arms fire. They took, or it sounded as if they immediately took 8 casualties - 8 KIA and many wounded and losing about four tracks and at least two ACAVs. The fire was so heavy that it forced them to pull back also about on line with the tank company. I am not sure exactly how far back they pulled, but I believe it was on line with the tank company. It was at this time that we received an order to flank the bunkers. We had received no fire over on my side. I was on the right flank, and we had received no fire. So I held my left flank in place and swept around. We did a turning movement so that we were facing east at this time. We had sort of an "L" formation with Bravo and the tank company over on the north, and I was on the west. I [took] a north - south line facing east. Again we received close air support, and we continued to move on through to the contact area. My right flank element never saw anything. They never had any contact at all. There were a few bunkers that they threw grenades in to, but there was never any fire received from them. The left flank and part of the center platoon were the ones that received the brunt of the fire which, at this time, was just sporadic. We received no RPG that I know of. We just received sporadic AK fire. The think the reason was that, when we were sweeping west [misstatement - he means east] the gun ports were all to the north, and the only things that were facing us were the entrances and exits to the bunkers so that the people in them couldn't actually fire at us very well. And as we moved, I dismounted the infantry and also dismounted some of the people from the tracks. As the tracks moved along they threw hand\ grenades into the bunkers and fired their small arms, their M17s, into the bunkers while the advancing line kept 50 (cal) fire close in to the front of the tracks to keep the people in the bunkers - to keep their heads down.
They received some secondary explosions in the bunkers, and actually we didn't stop to count and see who we had inside the bunkers. There was fire coming from them so we just threw the grenades in them and kept sweeping on through

CAMPION: I wonder if, at this point, you could describe the configuration of one of these bunkers and just exactly how one would go about throwing a grenade in it if he were moving through the area on a tracked vehicle or beside a tracked vehicle, particularly off a tracked vehicle.

SELSOR: The bunkers were "L" shaped would be the best way to describe them, and at the one end of the "L" was their firing port. This was facing north, and at the other end of the "L" was the entrance or exit.. This was a wider opening, and it was more of a straight up and down type thing where it would be difficult for a man to fire a weapon from it. So we came along ----- some of the tracks in the lead, if they kept up their 50 fire in there, they [enemy] would be unable to even poke their heads up to fire at us because the 50s were pretty good at going right through their overhead cover. We took a look at it later and the 50s would go right through the dirt and the logs and go into the bunker. So I imagine we were keeping their heads down, and as the track would pass by, the gunner would lean way out over the side of the track and just drop a grenade down inside of it. It was a vertical drop on most of them. We also had dismounted people. We were running about four people per track so that we could dismount one or two and fire our 50s and drive the track and still have people on the ground throwing the grenades, and I also had an infantry platoon with me.

CAMPION: I would gather that these were log and dirt bunkers with the silhouette above the ground?

SELSOR: They rose just slightly above the ground. I would say maybe two or three feet was the hump of dirt above the ground, and then they were sunk into the ground three or four feet so a short man could stand up inside it. They were good sized bunkers. They had a firing port so that they could stand up inside it and fire straight ahead. This was probably why Bravo Troop received their fire. The man could put an RPG in there and fire with relative safety, and the way that we were coming they could not fire at us very well. That is why we received only sporadic fire.

CAMPION: Are you satisfied with the manner or the technique in which you neutralized these bunkers? In retrospect, can you see a better way it could have been accomplished?

SELSOR: I think I would change the formation just slightly. Instead of putting all three platoons on line, I think I would keep one in reserve. With the infantry back there, let the lead elements fire at the bunkers and try to neutralize them that way and let this platoon in the rear be the ones to throw the grenades in and actually sweep through the area and make sure we had gotten everybody in them. Because after we had made our sweep all the way through, Bravo Troop swept south. And at this time it was to our direct rear. And they were still finding people alive in the bunkers where they were getting sporadic fire.

CAMPION: So the idea there then is that there is some value to having a man on the ground beside the bunker to make a thorough check of it rather than going by on a vehicle?

SELSOR: Definitely. The only thing the tracks could do was to keep their heads down, and of course the grenade was the best weapon that we had out there because even though the 50s did penetrate the bunkers, I don't know how effective they were inside. And you couldn't get anything else inside there. So as long as you could keep their heads down so that they weren't shooting at you and get up close enough to get a grenade inside, that was the best weapon we had out there. You had to have the man on the ground to throw the grenade in there. We continued to sweep to the east until we reached the clearing. We were now on the opposite side of the creek where we tried to launch the bridge. We came out into a clearing across there. We held on line there, and they had Bravo Troop sweep south to our rear. They did a fine job of policing up the battlefield, and they were still finding people alive in there. As for the extent of the actual fighting, this was the end of it for us. We pulled into the clearing and resupplied out there.

CAMPION: All right. Could you give me an idea of the total distance you moved during the duration of the morning? Also the physical dimensions of the area in which you were operating - in other words, north and south, east and west, how big an area were you operating in?

SELSOR: Well, I don't have a map with me, but when we moved out we moved from Doc. Doc is, I'd say, maybe two miles from where we tried to launch our bridge or where we had our initial contact. From there we went on upto where our stream crossing site was - I would say three or four kilometers. We went across there going due east [he means west] and we went about four kilometers and we got on line heading south. Now we usually use -- or this day we used - three to four rows of rubber between each vehicle. I extended on line, then, from eight hundred to a thousand meters with my Troop . We learned also from when the tank company got hit that they were too spread out, so we closed it up later on and only had about one row of rubber between the tracks. This was when we were making our assault. When we were this close, our extension is about five hundred meters. Our assault across Bravo Troop's front and the tank company's front was maybe two to three kilometers at the most into the clearing. .

CAMPION: Can you give me your estimate at this point of the capabilities of the enemy force that you faced? What is your assessment of his capabilities and abilities?

SELSOR: As I have said earlier, we received sporadic AK fire. In fact, as we checked the bunkers for the next few days, I think we found a total of about 5 AKs and I think that Bravo Troop maybe turned up about the same number. What they really seemed to be loaded with were RPGs. They have found it to be an effective antipersonnel weapon, and it is also effective against the tracks. So I think that this would be their basic weapon. I really think that we surprised them that day, and that is why we saw them running through the woods. But they had those bunkers prepared, and what we ran into was probably a screening force that was screening for a larger force that was running to the south. No one ever tried to give up, although I don't know how many chances they had. But they fought until they didn't have any ammunition. This is maybe another reason we didn't receive so much fire. As I say, we received some secondary explosions when we were throwing grenades in the bunkers, but not many. So they may have fired all their ammunition at Bravo Troop, and had nothing left. This may be their biggest weakness - that they have only what they are carrying on their backs, and they can't resupply that well in a big fire fight.

CAMPION: Then I gather you would describe them as a disciplined force that did not wish to make contact at that particular time?

SELSOR:: Yes, that would basically be it, because the bunkers we were running into, although you could fire from them, I don't think that they were fighting bunkers. They looked more like this was a staging area. They were resupply bunkers - a place where they had overhead cover from air observation and a place where it was cool inside there. There was a stream nearby. I'm sure it was a resupply area or a staging area, and they didn't want to make contact in there.

CAMPION: Without a map here, I am going to ask the Captain to describe as best he can the exact location of this bunker complex.

SELSOR: There are natural streams that cut the Michelin and there is this upper portion - the northeast portion - and we were finding them in the southwest corner of this northeast portion. It was actually just a little off center form the geographic center of the Michelin - just a little bit northeast of the center of the Michelin. We had been working in that area before, as I said, maybe four or five days before we went in there. And we had found this base camp area where we had found quite a large cache. We had gone in there the next day with engineers and blown up all these bunkers, but when we went in there on this day of contact, all these bunkers had been rebuilt. They had gone in there and completely rebuilt everything we had destroyed.

CAMPION: Captain, in closing here let me preface this question with the remark that your unit, or your armored element, had not had recent previous experience operating in the rubber such as one finds in the Michelin. Your area of operation is normally down around the Di An - Phu Loi area or on occasion in the jungle, maybe, or near jungle, but not in a rubber plantation as such. In view of that could you give me what you feel to be your one or two most pertinent lessons

SELSOR: [This section, a page and a half, is omitted for now - to be included later.]

CAMPION: In view of the extensive use made by the enemy of the RPG weapon , let me ask you if you move buttoned up in any of these engagements, and if so, in what manner.

SELSOR: I think most of the tank drivers drove buttoned up that day because we had been attacked before during a mortar attack, and we had taken some casualties with drivers that remained unbuttoned. The ACAV drivers, the majority of them, remained unbuttoned, just peering over the top of their hatches. I think most of them feel that they have just as much chance looking over it as down inside the ACAV because if you took an RPG in the front it would penetrate very easily. There would be no question on that-if you took one in the front that the driver would be a casualty. So they remained unbuttoned so they could see better and probably protect themselves better. Most of them carry a rifle or 45 up there next to them.

END OF INTERVIEW, SELSOR