"Bill Haponski" <haponski@seacove.net> was a former S3 and XO of the Blackhorse when he assumed command of the 1/4 Cav in the Spring of 1969.  The tank company he refers to as being attached to 1/4 cav was D company 1/11 cav.  He wrote: 


Atlas Wedge, Day 11: Attack on FSB Doc, 28 March 1969

Task organization: Hq 1-4 (-); C/1-4 (minus one platoon, plus one platoon 1-28 Inf, and one platoon B/2-34 Armor); A/2-28 Inf

Under my command for defense of the fire base: B/8-6 Arty (155) (or perhaps only one platoon, 3 tubes); D/1-5 Arty (105) (or perhaps B/2-33 Arty) [we will get logs for these units and check]; elements of 1st Engr Bn and 121st Sig Bn, and miscellaneous small specialty units.

Following is an entry from the journal of Stephen J. McGeady, Captain, Medical Corps, Medical Platoon Leader. Steve's platoon, or part of it, was working with C Troop. His words tersely depict the situation on the prior day:

27 March 1969. " RIF north. Saw Bat. sized V.C. staging/rest area. As we checked it out heard a Huey crash & headed over to secure craft. Burning with ammo lying around it. 5 U.S. KIA one thrown free with butt, torso off. 4 in burning craft. Torsos only recovered. 1st Air Cav. We returned to Doc. They took RPG fire on RIF & called in TAC air. We're bracing for ground attack tonight. We'll move inside & marry up with Bravo & 2 platoons will conduct roving patrol all night."

As the squadron log opens at 0001, almost all units are in FSB Doc. The log and other records do not seem to agree as to the disposition of C Troop on the night of the 27th before midnight. The log at 1910 contains a typo and states only C/-14 SP to AP site. Taken with an earlier entry, that seems to mean that one platoon of C Troop is on mounted ambush patrol near a stream 1000 meters northeast. I believe, however, that Steve's entry made on the evening of the 27th, is an accurate depiction. I am almost certain that my concept was to have two platoons wheel the perimeter, keeping on opposite sides from one another. Perhaps I later decided not to do that, and instead instructed that one platoon proceed to a normal stationary mounted ambush site, but move on order to wheel the perimeter. I'm hoping input from those who were there will clarify this important matter.

Also outside Doc is one squad of A/2-28 at an undisclosed location 500 meters from the fire base. This location was misreported in the previous evening's log, and I knew the reported location was wrong. Based on evidence from the after action report and a study of the map, I conclude they probably would have been northwest of the fire base, on the bank of a stream at XT608525, 500 meters out from the perimeter.

In addition to the S-3 logs, I have multiple sources of information on the events of the 28th. I will put them at the end of this commentary. Since they are narratives and give significant details, for now I will let the log entries speak for themselves with only minimal commentary. As has been the case in the past, the TOC did not record all critical events in the logs, but the entries do give us an idea as to events and their sequence.

At 0200 or some minutes later - perhaps 0215 (the exact time is unclear) FSB Doc is under attack.

0215 55; Request Spooky and a light fire team. ( I am 55, sometimes W55) 0224 I am told that Spooky 74 will ETA in 15 minutes (Surely by now, FSB Picardy, 10 km away, is providing illumination as well as HE. But artillery illumination is no substitute for Spooky.) 0225 I request light fire teams back to back 0227 Spooky 74 reports on station. He reports heavy cloud cover (which reduces the effect of the flares) 
0229 Light fire teams are scrambled 0231 Spooky reports having a limited amount of flares on board (probably having come straight here from a previous mission) 
0232 C55 ( Troop commander, Jim Selsor) reports 1 track is hit. It has a hole in the fuel cell. Negative casualties. 
0232 Selsor requests dustoff for one US person 
0245 Brigade reports Dustoff 72 ETA 15 minutes. Also a Blue Mary aerial rocket platoon is scrambled. (I do not remember what this was, but obviously wanted it at the time. I suspect it was a flight of about 4 Hueys fitted out with rocket pods.) 
0247 55; Quick sit rep. About 8 WIA, 3 seriously, and one man possibly lost in shuffle 
0248 55; Late entry. 0246. Received ground attack from several sides. Estimated 3 platoons of VC. Total of three tracks hit. 
0258 Brigade tells us Spooky 72 will be relieving 74 in about 05 minutes 
0301 34 (probably S-3); Late entry. 
0237. Defcons coming from Picardy 
0302 DO72; Dustoff 72 on station 
0305 Brigade tells us Spooky 72 will be replacing Spooky 74 as soon as he runs out of flares. 
0307 S74; Leaving station. 72 taking his place 
0312 BM47; Blue Mary only has about 45 minutes on station 0313 I report that C1/1-4 element (platoon, presumably) sweeping around perimeter. 
0318 55; Sit rep: tank took an RPG / 1 ACAV took 2 RPG/ 1 tank took direct hit with 60mm mortar 
0320 DO71; Dustoff 71 is on station. This is second dustoff 
0321 W55; Contact broke around 0230 
0325 55; Gunship to expend about 1,000 meters south of Doc. Mortars came from that location 
0334 W55; C/1-4 so far has negative findings on sweep around perimeter 
0336 W55; Request an infantry company due to US casualties.

(This entry relates to the infantry company that Division always had on alert for airlift. It was not a request for commitment of the company, but for it to be put on alert. As I recall, Colonel Haldane, 3rd Bde Cmdr, told me early in the fight we could have it if we needed it. I told him we didn't need it but it was good to know it was available. As the fight progressed and casualties mounted (44 WIA, 5 KIA by the end), I asked for the infantry company to go to condition Red, I believe it was, in which, as I recall, the infantry would leave their billets at Lai Khe or Di An for the helipad, prepared for airlift, but not actually lifted until ordered. It would have been a dicey operation to have actually inserted them. It was difficult enough to secure a spot for a single dustoff ship with all that was going on, much less an area for a company size landing which might come by shuttle rather than all at once, across a period of perhaps an hour, considering turn-around time out of Lai Khe or Di An. Unless we were attacked by a much larger force than I thought we were encountering, we could handle the situation. After a couple hours I told Colonel Haldane he could stand down the relief company. Probably at the same time or shortly thereafter I told him I wanted an airlifted infantry company after daylight for an assault.)

0336 W55; Sit rep approx 24 casualties, 4 of which were KIAs. 0341 DO72; Dustoff 72 will be coming back on station in approx. 20 min. 0342 86 (presumably one of the S-3 staff); 2/28 AP was not hit. Still at same location. C/1-4 AP was not hit. They are sweeping around perimeter.

Of all things that concerned me that night, the fate of that 12-man infantry patrol from A/2-28 was foremost on my mind. What was their situation, 500 meters out from the perimeter? They had only the usual weapons that a squad would have. We in Doc were getting hit by a strong ground attack. The patrol could not be contacted. Time after time we tried with no success. In coordinating the supporting fires we were careful to keep them away from their position. I feared the worst but could not send help to them until we could repel the attack on Doc itself. I was enormously relieved to get the report later that they were okay. They had kept their heads down while the base was being hit. They had seen no enemy at their position, and, thank God, they were not seen. Their only trouble had been that they could not get their radios to work during the early stages of the fight.

0345 Dustoff 71 is off, destination Dau Tieng (25th Division, 12 km southwest) 0346 BM47; Blue Mary 47 fully expended. Off station 
0347 S42; Spooky 72 has about 45 minutes left of illumination 
0350 55; Sit rep on personnel. 26 casualties, 4 of which are KIA 
0353 55; Request another Spooky or Moonshine. Estimated time of Spooky 72 has about 25 min. left on station. 
0401 DO72; Dustoff 72 on station 
0406 71 (Spooky Control?); Shadow 77 en route. ETA 20 min. Estimated 75 min. illumination 0410 Shadow 77 coming on station. 
0411 DO71; Dustoff 71 took casualties to Dau Tieng. Dustoff 72 took casualties to Lai Khe. 
0418 Shadow 77 on station 
0430 D71; Dustoff back on station 
0450 55; C/1-4 down vehicle. Receiving incoming. 
0450 71; Scramble light fire team. ETA 20-15 
0455 71; Dustoff 1 litter 0501 55; Darkhorse light fire team on station 
0511 S90; Scalper requests lift ship (ships?) to bring B/1-28 to Doc. (I believe this is not the relief company that was on standby. Rather, I saw an opportunity to exploit the attack on us by airlifting a company to use as a blocking force while Charlie Troop maneuvered -- I had no other maneuver element available to me, and no other infantry company except A/2-28 which I needed for the continued defense of Doc.) 0515 86; Shadow has 25 minutes left on station. Request another Spooky 
0516 DO72; Dustoff on station 0529 86; Dustoff complete. 1 litter 2nd Surgical at Lai Khe 
0533 S90; Spooky 74 will be on station in 15-20 
0559 Spooky 74; Spooky 74 on station 
0602 71; CO wants MO gas first thing this morning 
0606 Shadow 77; 74 left station 
0631 Darkhorse 37; Light fire team left station 
0639 55; CO says it was company size who stood off and fired RPGs and mortars at a distance; Did not want to make close combat. No sightings. Hit ford site close in. 82mm-60mm, RPG fire and mortars 
0641 Spooky 74; Spooky 74 left station for Arty warnings (This probably refers to a preplanned B-52 strike going in somewhere near Doc, but not of course called for by us . By SOP. aircraft always were warned to avoid the strike zone by 10 nautical miles.) 0655 86; Found location XT615523 1 dead NVA 
0714 55; CO thinks they received 3 107 rockets which landed outside the wire 
0716 55; Found at the ford site 4 dead NVA soldiers, 2 RPG launchers, 3 RPG rounds. 
0728 55; Found 4 more bodies NVA 0747 Darkhorse 39; Gunship says light to moderate traffic along stream edge 
0745 55: C/1-4 conducting local RIFs 0756 C55; C/1-4 one of the bodies had a notebook 
0758 55; CO wants bulldozer out at Doc to cut down field of fire 
0805 DH39; On a 060 azimuth the other side of the Rome plow [cut?] there is a clearing which looks like it had recent activity. XT622530 (This is very near the site of the C/1-4 mounted AP. Did the NVA get close to them?) 
0807 DH39; 100 meters SW of Doc LOH spotted fresh dug fighting positions. (Apparently they had crept in quietly after dark, dug their positions within 100 meters of the wire, and we had not detected them.)
0808 Fighter 38; 5 is 10 from FSB Doc. (This is BG Smith, Assistant Division Commander, coming to see me.) 0816 DH39; Hunter killer team left station 0829 65; First Hook of POL and ammo left Lai Khe for Doc 
0901 71; B/1-4 proceeds from Lorraine to Picardy between 1000-1200. B55 says he won't even make it to Lorraine until 1400. (Apparently I had gotten permission to bring B Troop back up with us, or perhaps it was already planned for the forthcoming attack into the Michelin. They had been gone just one day and missed the attack on Doc. I don't know what to make of Captain Dennis' statement he won't make it to Lorraine until 1400, except that he must have been south of it when told he would rejoin us.) 
0905 Selsor reports he has finished sweeping one side of the stream and will go across and sweep the other. (Several streams intersect vicinity Doc. He probably is referring to Suoi Boi) 0915 F24F (Probably the commanding general's pilot); CG will be landing Doc in 03 to 05 minutes 
0927 C55; C/1-4 has fire fight and incoming rounds. 2 or 3 RPGs and small arms fire 0928 86; Doc receiving incoming (mortars) 0935 SY36; Sunders is on station at this time (I have no idea what this entry means.) 0940 C55; C/1-4 receiving RPGs over our heads 0944 I report I am going airborne at this time 0945 I report C/1-4 thinks he has VC surrounded in woods 
0951 I report that I will insert C/1-28 into the open area west of C/1-4. (Not B/1-28 as previously announced.) 
0954 DH33; Hunter killer on station 
0955 68 (someone in S-3?); C1/28 will be inserted XT607522, blocking NE. ( This is on the stream Suoi Boi which Charlie Troop is working.)

By 1000 the maneuver is under way to try to trap the NVA. I tell the platoon of A/1-28 to move to C/1-4 position. (I believe this platoon was already opcon to Charlie Troop, and do not know why this direction was necessary.) I also tell A/2-28 at Doc to send a platoon out to C/1-4. Obviously I was no longer concerned about the security of Doc, rather about closing with the enemy force Charlie Troop had encountered.)
1003 68; C/1-28 will be inserted in 15
1010 55; A/2-28 plt SP Doc for C/1-4 position
At 1012 I instruct Darkhorse to put its scout ship in on the wood line where the VC are surrounded. Then at 1027 I get a call from Sidewinder, the Air Force Forward Air Controller; He is on station (probably in a fixed wing plane). He reports that his fighters are ready. (I don't recall if I requested them or whether they just showed up. They sometimes did this after monitoring a ground contact, and usually reported in even if not, telling us they were on station.)
1037 55; A/2-28 has linked up with C/1-4
1039 55; C/1-4 left a vehicle to recover bodies and weapons. They are receiving sniper rounds.
At 1045 I report that the insertion of C/1-28 is complete, and a few minutes later order headquarters section to send 2 Zippos to the Charlie Troop location. 

At 1100 I have brought the fighter bombers in, dropping two napalms, and at 1107 I report that the Zippos are expending. At 1109 the fighter bombers are high and dry, and a minute later the gun ships make their run and expend in the same location (which unfortunately is not recorded in the log, but surely is not more than a kilometer or two from Doc). 
At 1116 Darkhorse leaves station, and I tell the TOC to get going on replacements for C Troop to fill the vacancies caused by casualties. I direct Selsor to move down and sweep the wood line. By noon it is apparent that the NVA we were trying to close with have managed to get away, and our attention now turns to terminating the operation and resupply. I don't remember why I made this decision, but probably because we were still planning a major attack into the Michelin and we needed to prepare for it rather than chase scattered small elements of the NVA force which had attacked us in Doc. I extract C/1-28.and move the ground elements back to Doc.

During the afternoon I request all available Darkhorse VRs plus a LOH for me, presumably with a view toward continuing reconnaissance for our forthcoming attack. At 1745 B Troop lead elements close on Doc, a welcome sight. A/2-28 needs an urgent dustoff at dusk, whether from a sniper or not, I can't tell from the log.

On the preceding evening we had planned to have one cavalry platoon wheel the perimeter in case of attack, to drive into the enemy and break up the assault. This worked so well that I decided to employ a platoon on mounted night patrol all night long, wheeling the perimeter. Although tough on the platoon which would be selected, it would give the task force a high measure of security and enhance the quality of sleep for the rest of the tired soldiers. At 1900 our TOC puts out the word that there will be no nighttime activities tonight -- i.e., ambush patrols. However there will be 1 platoon of cav as roving patrol around Doc approximately 200 meters outside the wire. At 2006 the patrol begins. Thus history records the famous Haponski
"Circle Your Wagons and Shoot to the Outside Maneuver -- CYWASOM," taught ever since in mounted combat courses throughout the world. (In Tibet I am told they substitute shaggy ponies for ACAVs and yaks for tanks.)

At 2255 the soldiers manning our new tower fire on something, but "have a negative reaction as yet." Probably most of the negative reaction came from troopers who had their sleep interrupted.

At 2257 I get the news that we will be getting a tank company minus one platoon opcon to us from 11 ACR. They will arrive at FSB Doc between 1300-1500. Obviously Division was looking to us to play a key role in the forthcoming attack. There are no further log entries, and the log is closed at 2400, the end of a very long day.

A few items bear comment: Our original sources show I estimated the size of the attacking force at one company. They would have been the ones firing the machine guns, small arms, and RPGs. A unit of this size normally also would have had a sapper platoon with bangalore torpedoes for penetration of the perimeter. We had found several in the Michelin a few days before. Was such a unit in the attack force? Probably. In addition, nowhere do I record what seems obvious. This attacking company must have been supported by a sizable mortar unit. The one hundred-fifty mortar round impacts that the division's damage assessment team counted the next day amount to a lot of rounds fired. 82mm mortars especially are heavy, and so is the ammo. I believe that another company of mortar men was in support, or at least a platoon.

In the Michelin we had found 57 mm and 75 mm recoilless rifle rounds. There seems to be no evidence these weapons were used in the attack (thank God). I do not believe that the enemy expected to overrun us, though they hoped they could and would try. I find their audacity and skill awesome. They crept up to a fire support base which included an armored cavalry unit, dug their fighting positions (and probably a tunnel or two), and launched an attack from all around the perimeter. They must have been preparing for several nights, moving the heavy mortar and RPG rounds forward and caching them not far out from the perimeter. They surely would not have lugged all that with them, then dug their positions and done everything else necessary in just the few hours of darkness they had prior to the attack.

When I read the log I recognized how busy I was just in coordinating the supporting fires - artillery, Spooky, Blue Mary rocket platoon, gun ships. I have forgotten what those supporting fires coming in had looked like - probably didn't want to remember - but once in the 11th ACR I was in the air and comfortably witnessed from a distance a fire support base under attack at night. It was an astonishing display of light and sound, and I'm sure ours was too.

The role of the medics in this attack needs to be addressed, but I want to do it properly later when I have more of the facts and the time to do it. Can you imagine what it must have been like for a dustoff pilot to bring a ship in while the attack was going on? And they did this several times. Doc Mc Geady and all of his medics had their hands full that night and did a superb job. I pinned the Bronze Star V on him and some other troopers the next day as impact awards, and they were richly deserved.

After the attack Colonel Haldane complimented me on how cool I was, and I appreciated that, but he hadn't known how I felt in the first minute of the attack. I believe that for a full 60 seconds I could say nothing. The horrendous impacts so startled (terrified?) me, even though I had anticipated the attack, that I could not talk. After that I didn't stop talking, I'm sure, the rest of the night. I had three radios in my command track, and I would look around to see what was going on, speak into one handset, look around again and say something in another, and so on throughout the night.

Then there was the NVA body count. We found only ten, but drag marks led us to report another 15 possible enemy KIA. The amazing thing was that at daylight when we began RIFing the perimeter and counting them, later when we returned, most of the bodies were gone. The enemy always went to extremes to recover their dead, but this beat everything I saw before or after Doc. Perhaps they had dug tunnels in the area into which they dragged the bodies, but this was done in the daylight within a hundred to a few hundred meters of our perimeter. The grass was high - which is one reason I called for the dozer to be brought back out to us for improving fields of fire - but even given grass and hillock cover, their feat is remarkable.

Finally, at some point I want to address the weaknesses of our FSB system, as demonstrated by the casualties we took at Doc. In fact, I want to address some of the weaknesses of our mounted combat as practiced in Vietnam, but that will have to come later.

Following are excerpts from several original source materials in my possession which relate to the attack on Doc. I am refraining at this time from naming the soldiers killed in action while under my command on that day. I want to carefully check all possible sources to ensure accuracy, and I have not had time yet to do that. The work we do on this project will be dedicated to them and the others who did not return.

******************************************************************************

From my journal, 17 April:

As I wait to depart on R & R, I think of the last few weeks. On the night of the 27th I could feel the danger in our situation. We occupied the fire support base closest to the 165th Regiment, 7th NVA Division, battle-tested troops. We were totally alone, our support consisting only of artillery and air-lifted troops to be landed at night, a difficult means of reinforcing. Before dark I reviewed contingency plans with the infantry, artillery, and cavalry commanders.

At 0200 I was instantly awakened by the unimaginable din of mortars and RPG's impacting inside the perimeter. Hell was never so brilliantly lit with flashes and crashing sounds. Then came the deafening roar of our weapons as we fought back, tank guns, machine guns and small arms shooting into the night. I could not believe what I saw, RPG's flashing into us, their individual shrieks lost in the general din, tracers ripping into our positions, and tracers coming back out from it. Men were shouting and running. Reports came in of the dead and dying, of the wounded by the dozens. I had requested a flare ship and light fire team. My whole energies were devoted to controlling all the fires and the actions of the troops. A platoon sent out to wheel the perimeter became mired and was attacked. A twelve man patrol had not reported its situation. Then it fell quiet. The firing had ceased, and soon the day came. We had lost five killed and forty-four wounded. The captain standing next to me was lightly wounded. A large fragment of an RPG was resting on the top of my command track. Holes ripped in our RPG screens were visible with the light. Our count showed that over 150 mortar rounds, 3-107mm rockets, and countless RPG's had hit our position in a brilliantly timed attack. Ten enemy lay dead outside the wire, and drag marks and blood trails showed where others had disappeared into the night.

With daylight the generals came. They asked questions, praised and criticized. Then at 0830, as the division commander talked to me, rounds again impacted within a hundred meters of us. I went airborne and fought another short engagement. Sniping continued until noon, and then it was finally over. The battle of FSB Doc had ended.



From Combat After Action Interview Report:

TF Haponski moved elements into and occupied FSPB Doc on 25 Mar. The next significant engagement for either of the units (TF 1-28 and TF Haponski) occurred on 28 Mar when, early in the morning hours, FSPB Doc was subjected to a heavy indirect fire and ground attack from several directions. Enemy strength was estimated in excess of one company. The engagement resulted in 4 US KIA and 26 US WIA* with 2 tanks and 1 APC suffering damage. A sweep of the perimeter area just after daylight and on 1 Apr located 10 enemy KIA and 2 RPG launchers. Scattered small engagements and attacks by fire continued throughout the area during the morning.

*Note, Division reports were notoriously inaccurate in after-action reporting od both friendly and enemy KIA and WIA for our command. Surprisingly enough, they reported too few in each category on both sides. I kept a pocket notebook with the exact figures, verifying many of the body count myself. When I record 5 US KIA and 44 WIA I am confident those figures came from my pocket notebook. The problem with after-action reports regarding numbers is that they are compiled from logs which often do not record all the input.

From Combat After Action Interview, Haponski:

On the 28th there was a major attack launched on the Fire Support Base beginning at 0220 hours. It was a magnificently coordinated attack with massive mortar rounds and RPGs coming in simultaneously exactly at that time to include machine gun and AK fire from outside the perimeter. The mortar rounds landed squarely in the center of the Fire Support Base and spread out on all sides into the wire and out beyond the wire where my Charlie Troop was RONing - the bulk of Charlie Troop. The RPGs came from all sides, and I could not begin to estimate the number. The reports were that they were being fired from every side of the perimeter, and I can personally verify by watching them come in and listening to them that this was the case. As I say, it was a magnificently coordinated attack initially. The mortaring ceased after a period of, I would estimate, 20 to 30 minutes and we were able to evacuate the wounded and the dead. We sustained casualties both from the RPG fire and from the mortar fire. In the initial stages of the attack we had a contingency plan that one platoon of Charlie Troop, upon any attack, would sweep immediately outside around the perimeter, wagon wheel around the perimeter, firing to the outside. This was done, and I feel this was the determining factor in discouraging any major ground attack. The closest that the NVA got to the wire was about 75 meters. I feel they probably would have come in had they felt that they could take it, but with the Charlie Troop platoon wheeling the perimeter and firing, it made it difficult for them. Unfortunately during the course of this action, at about 0330 in the morning, one of the Charlie Troop vehicles threw a track and another one became bogged in a swamp just outside the Fire Support Base which immobilized the platoon for a period long enough for the NVA to group and attack the platoon. The platoon responded with massive fire power. We continued to call in the artillery which had been coming in all this time, and this attack was defeated with the wounding of only one of our own men. The attack again was launched with mortars and with RPGs and with small arms fire. The one thing that did bother me all night long as we continued to receive this fire was the twelve man patrol. This patrol we had in the stream bed about 500 meters from our position, and it was obvious that there was a major attack on the Fire Support Base, and for a period of time we lost communications with this patrol. And with all the firing that was going on, it was difficult to tell if they were in difficulty. As it turned out, they were not, and the night passed [for them] with no incident. The shell craters the next morning revealed that there were in excess of 150 rounds of mortars - 60s and 82s - and there were three 107 rockets which were fired during the course of the attack. We could not estimate how many RPGs were fired from outside the perimeter. Many of them were launched as mortars in the standoff attack from, I would estimate, anywhere from 200 to 400 meters out. In the morning, General Smith came to survey the situation, and shortly after that, I believe it was around 0830, General Talbott came. As General Talbott was talking to me on the western edge of the perimeter, another mortar attack hit just outside the perimeter along with RPGs. This time the entire Cavalry Troop was outside the perimeter, and they saw the spot from where the RPGs were launched. They immediately went to it and raked it with fire. Unfortunately, apparently the small element that had fired the RPGs had escaped before we were able to close with them. The sniping continued around the Fire Support Base until about noontime and after that there was no more activity. That then is a recap of the events of the night of the 28th - the attack on the Fire Support Base.

From Steve McGeady's journal:

28 March. We got the hell kicked out of us. When will we ever learn? Sleeping out under the stars. V.C. hit at 0215 with mortars, rockets, & RPGs. Struck in right hand by frag. No sweat. Treated casualties till 4:30 A.M. & sent out patrol to RIF. They took rocket fire. Dust off [?? 4]. First close contact with rockets & mortars. Last too I hope. Scared as hell when had to close back door & couldn't undo latch. Slept like dead man when attack stopped. RIF in A.M. yielded 8 V.C. bodies & 5 RPG-7 launchers. That's a bad sign; they're after armor.

>From my draft novel, written Fall 69: "Mike" is a loose representation of me. "Little Henry" is my ACAV driver.

Hell was lit brilliantly at 0200 hours. Impacts of mortars, rockets and RPG's were like hundred of huge flashbulbs all being fired within a few seconds, silhouetting men in weirdly strained positions against the blackness. The first horrendous concussion sent a sharp stab of pain through Mike's ears, and for a moment he could hear nothing except a loud ringing sound, then above it he heard explosions and screams: "I'm hit. Oh, Christ, my leg's gone. Help me!" The machine guns, answering from everywhere along the perimeter, first in frantic bursts, then in a steady din, spewed tracers out into the grass and woods and sent ricochets careening off into the sky. Above this din was a din more intense of shrieks and whistles of rockets and mortars and RPG's still coming in, and tank guns and artillery, and screams in a cacophony of death. His ears still rung, but he could hear himself saying into his hand mike,
"-----fighter bombers, gun ships and Spooky. I'll take them back to back, just keep them coming." His emotionless voice gave instructions to all the commanders as artillery pounded the area outside the perimeter. The first flares had popped overhead and lighted a fantastic scene, an inferno where inside the perimeter men were running and dragging others and leaping on vehicles and leaping off vehicles and firing weapons and waving their arms, and outside the perimeter men were churning toward them, firing as they came.

[omission]

"Get that platoon moving," Mike was saying. "Sir," came the voice in his crash helmet, "it's had some wounded and they're trying to get them off."

"Get that platoon moving!' His voice was cold and unhurried, and in a moment he saw the tanks and ACAVs move out through a gap the infantry made in the protective wire and quickly closed again as the last vehicle exited. The cavalry began wheeling the perimeter like Indians around a wagon train, only Indians shooting to the outside, protecting the train.

[omission]

Infantry bunkers spewed streams of tracers, and Mike called into his handset, "Make sure your men lift their fire when the cav platoon swings in front of them." [omission] The Cobra gun ships were approaching and asking for instructions. Mike gave them their directions, lifted the artillery fire on one side of the perimeter only, and brought them in. From the seat on top of his ACAV, Mike saw the helicopters salvo their rockets. He called first into one handset, then another, and another. The loudspeakers in front of him babbled: "-----ETA for Spooky, two-zero minutes-----we've got one Kilo, four Whiskies-----Roger, shift flares more to the north-----how'd that last run look?-----two dead-----we're cuttin' the shit out of 'em!"

[omitted]

>From the top of his vehicle, Mike now directed the attack of fighter bombers. Five hundred pound bombs shook the earth. [omitted] Except for some shouts and occasional firing and cries of the wounded and those trying to help them or trying to reorganize their positions, the inside of the fire base was relatively quiet. Mike called for the medevac helicopters to come in. [omission] Under the light of flares, the cavalry roaming the area outside the base blasted everything that moved. At one minute Mike was seeing by the light of those flares; in the next Little Henry breathed, "Dawn," and as if Little Henry had just then created it, it was dawn, and Mike was seeing by its light. [omission] A radio somewhere suddenly came to life and blared a wakeup call, "Goooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooooood mor-ning Vietnam!" To the heroic strains of the Star Spangled Banner, Armed Forces Network Vietnam, from its comfortable studio in Saigon, was cheerfully welcoming the new day.