"Bill Haponski" <haponski@seacove.net> was a former S3 and XO of the Blackhorse when he assumed command of the 1/4 Cav in the Spring of 1969.  He wrote: 

From previous commentary:

Regarding Colonel Patton, Ray Naclerio sent a nice note. Ray was our artillery liaison officer during much of 1969, but also was detailed for periods to 11th ACR. He was shot down and seriously injured on a mission with them. Ray got a battlefield commission. Of all sources of commission, I cannot imagine any honor higher than that. The few soldiers I knew who got such commissions had already demonstrated their professionalism and knowledge on the field of battle. What other officer, upon receiving a commission, could say that?

Ray says:

"What I recall about Col. Patton is that it seemed like he asked the impossible and got it. I felt for some reason that he knew every single mans limit and this made me feel that he really cared about every man. While I was with them I only met him once for a minute ( I was still an E-6 ) but he seemed to know that I was getting my 2LT bars soon and that I knew what I was doing. A few years later I met him again when he was a 1 star at a Batt. Maint. officer school in Germany. Every 20 min. he would make them stop the class so he could answer the telephone. The first day he stopped the class so he could introduce me to the class and tell them that we served together in Nam and that I received a Battlefield Commission. I can tell you now that I turned red and that I was also proud that he remembered me."

Regarding Spooky, I said C46. In fact I believe there were still a few of these around and used in Vietnam; however, the later (but still ancient) C47 was usually used as Spooky.

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Atlas Wedge, Day 7, 24 March 1969

At 2400 we are RONing in the Michelin at the edge of the rubber, about 2 km west of FSB Doc, still under opcon to 11th ACR. At 0347, Captain Selsor, commanding C Troop, reports that a trip flare went off and ignited a claymore before burning out. No casualties. Jim believes an animal set off the flare. All is quiet until 0558 when C Troop gets movement on its eastern perimeter (toward FSB Doc), and recons by fire with negative results. After daylight the log records a few admin items related to resupply.

I must have gone back to Doc from the RON position because at 0940 a hunter-killer team is reported landing there to talk with me. At 1002 I direct A/1-28 to look for a stream crossing place. (I'm puzzled by that entry since no stream crossing appears necessary to accomplish the mission we are about to begin. I'll have to study this one further.) We are "Going to work SW corner, C on flank /A on R flank. Will RIF that portion of AO".

That entry indicates that when we complete the day's mission we will have worked most of the northern third of the Michelin Plantation since first entering the rubber two days earlier.

At1026 Sentry 6 is reported to be landing at my location. Since I see no entries regarding a LOH arriving for me in the early morning, as was the case on each preceding day, I assume I was on my command track, already in the rubber with the two ground units and the remainder of my command section. Enough open areas exist within the rubber to enable a chopper to land. A minute later Sentry 6 is on the ground. It is Colonel Haldane, CO 3rd Brigade. We are still opcon to 11th Cav at this time, so no doubt I anticipate a change in our status. I am told we will return opcon to 3rd Brigade at 1300. I put this word out at 1058. (I don't recall what happens to 11th ACR after this. Perhaps the next day's logs will remind me.) As a result of this meeting I call commanders and tell them that rules of engagement are to identify before engaging. I don't know if some 1st Division unit had taken friendlies under fire by mistake, or shot up civilians through faulty identification. I seem to recall that there were still a few civilians in the tiny hamlets within the Michelin. One POW report states that the captured man's unit was to attack one of these
hamlets. More likely, any civilians in the Michelin had already been converted, willingly or not, to the VC/NVA cause, and at the time of Atlas Wedge were supporting the enemy by providing bunker digging, liaison, guide, lookout, and base camp caretaker services. I was always greatly concerned about civilian casualties, and I probably reminded commanders to tell the troops that unless they were being shot at, not to engage unless we saw NVA in uniform, or VC carrying weapons. (As I recall, the few VC that U.S troops encountered on Atlas Wedge mostly wore black trousers and shirts. The NVA we killed or captured wore light khaki uniforms, pith helmets or caps.)

The Michelin has several streams in it. The most prominent in the areas we had worked to this point was the Sui Boi, coming out of the northern section, then turning south toward FSB Doc. The rubber is to the west of the stream, and the jungle to the east. Another stream was the Sui Cau Trac which flowed northwest to southeast and divided the top third of the Plantation from the bottom two-thirds. Both streams were passable for armored vehicles at some points (but not all) during this transitional period between the dry season of the winter and the monsoons that would be coming in May. Our area of operations seems to have been the entire northern third of the Michelin, that is, everything north of Sui Cau Trac. When I earlier said we were to work the SW corner, that quite certainly meant the southwest corner of our AO, not of the Michelin itself.

At 1107 I order A/1-28 to move in column behind C/1-4 to the first available point, then cross river (stream) and RIF south. (I'm puzzled by this entry since A Company was already north of the stream, and we are later RIFing north. It doesn't make sense.) At 1155 one of my calls is logged, "C/1-4 found baby. Location 585535." That entry stuns me until I realize it has
to be a typo, "body.". The entry continues, "NV dress in khakis. Only had web gear, no documents. Dead about one week."

At 1201 I report that both units have married up at that same location. At 1225 C Troop has moved only a few hundred meters when it finds "Some dead VC. Very old." (That is, they have been dead some time.) They uncover a significant cache of arms including a back plate for a 50 cal anti aircraft machine gun, bag of salt, bangalore torpedo, 60mm mortar and 5 rifle
grenades (Chicom).

At 1300 we check out of 11th ACR net and into 3rd Brigade. At 1335 we are taking a 30 minute break just north of this point, then C Troop moves on line RIFing around an old base camp area with A/1-28 following as a reaction force. During the afternoon we continue to RIF the area north of Sui Cau Trac, finding a bunker complex with signs of recent activity, a rice cache and 82mm rounds. A Company will stay and work that site while C Troop continues to RIF. At 1550 I report that we have found "some documents and captured bicycles. I'll send bicycles back on resupply with documents. Make damn sure those bicycles get back to my HQ. I want them." A few minutes later I get the return call, "Bicycles will have to come back on 2nd sortie. Recommend you send documents back on first sortie."

No doubt you're going to hound me until I explain the bicycles, so I might as well do it now. It's not that I wanted to ride around base camp when and if I ever got back to Di An. It's just that I had fallen for a little 12 year old Vietnamese girl, the same age as my daughter.

When I was in 11th Cav we had burned down a thatched hut with an errant illumination round. A widow and her four daughters lived in it. The hamlet, way out in the boondocks, was controlled by VC until we began our pacification efforts. Our engineers built the family a new house, and the hamlet a school. Initially Nhan was terrified of me and any other soldiers, but gradually she and I became friends. I did everything I could to help the family, which is another story. But it explains the bicycles for Nhan
and her two little sisters, along with captured rice and other items I sent them from the stocks which the NVA in the Michelin had been kind enough to provide. Enough on that for now.

At 1625, near the last location, C Troop finds more rice and five 57mm recoilless rifle rounds. "Still pulling up stuff and RPGs also." Twenty minutes later I ask for a hunter-killer team to assist in our recon. (I guess at that time I had gotten used to D Troop Air not really being part of the squadron, but as I read these entries I flinch a little at having had to request assistance from our own air troop. (Major, would you be so kind as to send me one of my hunter-killer teams?) We could have been used to much
more advantage during Atlas Wedge had Division allowed us to perform the kind of mission we were equipped by TOE to do. Instead, the division commander, G-2, and G-3 looked upon the cav squadron's cav troop as theirs in the "find and fix" part of U S efforts to defeat the enemy. I suspect this was true in other divisions as well.

At 1646 I report that C Troop has found in the same location one "AK 47, some cook pots, very recent activity. Possible Battalion NVA moved out of area recently to south." Ten minutes later the troop finds over a ton of rice.

The hunter-killer team reports it will be on station in 20-30 minutes. Since we are at the very southern edge of our AO I request a 1 km extension of AO to the south for artillery purposes. We will be RONing in the area tonight, and I want room to call in artillery instantly if necessary without having to have it cleared through some other headquarters.

At 1725 A55 requests "permission to take security off of AVLB." He wants the unit back at NDP (presumably Doc) "due to loss of another protection at NDP."

I take this entry to be a call from the CO of A2-28 who was back at Doc, not the CO of A/1-28 who was with us, presumably, in the Michelin. I deny the request, but from the log entries I am puzzled as to what really was going on here. Also at 1805 I request a slick to transport an infantry squad for ROH to Doc. I can't recall what an ROH stands for, but presumably some kind
of reaction force to be airlifted and inserted in critical situations, much as an ARP platoon. This must have been a requirement imposed on me by Brigade as a contingency for support anywhere in the brigade's AO.

At 1830 the hunter-killer team which has been reconning for us has departed station for return to home base. I report a consolidated RON for all elements at XT563525, near the cache site on the Sui Cau Trac. It is now probably quite dark. At 1900 C Troop has spotted 4 personnel 600 meters to the east and are engaging. Apparently we request a hunter-killer team, and 50 minutes later Bulldog 25 is on station. At the same time C Troop has more movement, this time to the northwest, and is engaging.

At 2010 I summarize the findings of the cache to be reported to Brigade TOC: 21 M79 rounds, 2 US grenades, 20 Chicom grenades, 1 B-40 propelled charge, 18 82mm rounds, 1 belt VC 50 caliber, 13 belts 7.63 linked, 1 M16, 1 drum belt RPD, 18 75 mm rounds, 1 Chicom claymore, several thousand feet of claymore wire, 4 AK magazines, 5 boxes 82mm fuses, 4 boxes AK ammo, 2 of which were sealed, 2 boxes 7.62 rimmed, 4500 pounds of rice (will evacuate), 2500 pounds of rice (destroyed), 7 bicycles, clothing and miscellaneous web gear and documents. Thirty-five minutes later Bulldog 25 has left station.

At 2108, A/2-28 has given a negative sitrep, the first time all day that an entry is made for this unit back at Doc.

At 2137 I request a Moonshine for a downed track. It will take 2 hours to get the track up. (A Moonshine, as I recall, was similar to a Spooky only it carried all illumination, no guns. I think it was a C47, but may have been a Huey. Would a Huey have been able to carry enough illumination for a 2 hour mission? I doubt it.) At 2218 the Moonshine is on station and the vehicle crew can now work more effectively under its light. Just before midnight Charlie Troop requests that a complete 50 caliber machine gun and 10 boxes of ammunition be sent out from base camp.

>From Combat After-Action Interview, 17th Military History, Haponski:

"We found on the 24th a very large rice and munitions cache in the southern part of our area. There were brand new bunkers built in there, some of them without overhead cover, and we had just begun to develop the total before daylight ran out on us on the 24th. The NVA continued to probe us during that period, and we returned fire at distances too great to have effected
any kills."

In summary, on the morning of the 24th we are in RON positions 2 km west of Doc in the plantation, still under opcon of 11 ACR. We move out to reconnoiter to the north and west in the rubber and begin encountering caches, bunkers, and dead bodies. In early afternoon we revert opcon to 3rd Brigade and continue our search mission. By evening we have discovered several smaller caches and bunker areas, one battalion-size, fresh base camp complex, and we have uncovered a large cache of munitions and rice. At dusk we have some sightings and we recon by fire off and on for about an hour and then no further contacts. Two units RON near the base camp complex while one unit remains at Doc.

The next day is to be one of the most significant in my life.

At 0308 we are told that the firefly is coming from Phu Loi and a light fire team from Lai Khe. Darkhorse 39, the LFT, soon arrives on station and I tell him that C55 will direct him. Twenty minutes later I report negative casualties to any C55 element. 

At 0352 the gun ship reports having made its first expenditure and requests Selsor to adjust fire. I tell the arty lno to crank up some H&I (harassment and interdiction rounds) after the light fire team expends. 

At 0359 the light fire team reports it received some small arms fire during one of its passes. 

At 0407 I tell the LFT to expend its load and I request a replacement firefly. (The one that was earlier reported coming from Phu
Loi seems to have been flying its mission during the engagement although no log entries reflect this.) A few minutes later I am told that none is available, that gun ships are scarce. When firefly has to leave station at 0410 I talk with someone in 11th ACR TOC and am assured they will do thei best to get us another firefly. We receive warning of a B-52 strike going into a box only 2 km south of Doc within the next hour, and probably smirk, thinking that should keep the 11th Cav guys at Doc awake so they can work on my request. 

At 0420 Selsor reports that his AP saw 3 VC moving west and another 2 VC trying to get between his RON and his AP. C Troop opens fire and receives small arms in return. At 0512 Selsor again reports movement between the RON and AP. An M79 (rifle grenade launcher) recons by fire, and a fire fight is in progress. Jim says they spot a few personnel running north and they are engaging with .50 cal and M60s (7.62mm machine guns). At 0524 Charlie Troop AP reports receiving a few rounds of AK from the east. In C Troop RON, Selsor reports more sightings to the north. He has one US slightly wounded, and the medic will take care of him. At 0542 Selsor has movement on the south side of his RON, and we get a call that 11th ACR is scrambling a light fire team for us. Fifteen minutes later I report to 11th ACR that A/1-28 is putting artillery in southeast and northeast of its AP.I give resupply instructions for back haul after daylight.. At 0615 Rebel 36 is on station and remains there for the next 25 minutes. As soon as it is light enough, our two units RIF around their nighttime positions. I get a call that the man who was hit last night was wounded by friendly M79 fire and he is back on duty. The results of the night's activities?

From my journal, 16 April:

"Our return fire was controlled due to the proximity of my units to one another, and the clash was short. Except for a blood trail, we had no evidence of having inflicted any damage, and, luckily, none was inflicted on us."

From Combat After Action Interview, 17th History, I say,:
"That night (after midnight on the 23rd) in our RON position we received about an estimated two squad probe and . . . there were negative casualties apparently on either side."

My LOH arrives at 0730 but has radio problems, naturally, and I'm told a second one should be there in 10-15 minutes. But at 0809 I'm told both loaches are down for maintenance. (By now have you guys figured out why my hair turned prematurely gray? I loved the loach when it was working right and only had to use it for visual reconnaissance or column control. And despite the maintenance problems we had, most often it was a highly dependable machine and difficult to knock down when hit. But a loach as a C & C ship during a contact was another matter, mostly because of its frequent radio problems.)

At 0852 Charlie Troop has a sighting of 10 VC and I direct our ground units to vicinity Violet. (Another coded location. Obviously we were using colors to designate them.) At 0912 my command TOC gets a call from D6: "Have CO stay on ground. He would like to talk to him," and a minute later 55L (one of the S-3 staff with me?) reports, "DG has landed/ talking to CO.".

D6, DG (typo for D6?, or acronym for Danger 6?). Who is he? Obviously a higher level commander, but not Patton who is Tyrant 6. Colonel Haldane, 3rd Bde CO? Probably not since we are no longer opcon to him. General Talbott? Could be. If so, when I earlier said I did not remember him visiting a field location except FSB Doc then my memory was faulty. I do recall talking to him sometimes when he was airborne over one of our contacts. Whoever it was, apparently the visit did nothing to change our mission which seems to have been to move to designated blocking positions and RIF around them. At 0930 an air cav scout reports seeing "new bunkers in Area Violet / they weren't there yesterday." The enemy in the Michelin was amazingly adept at constructing bunkers, then after they were destroyed, quickly reconstructing them when he wanted to. (Much more on this during my commentary on subsequent operations.)

At 1125 I want a correct set of Points of Origin to be sent out with the resupply choppers. (Some of you may recall that we got overlays designating certain N-S and E-W grid line intersections as Pos. Then we could give locations in reference to them rather than in the clear.) In the early afternoon we RIF in vicinity of the blocking positions and I direct hot chow and MO gas be brought out. We go into RON and AP positions early (around 1600) in order to resupply and eat, a treat, considering we were up all night with contacts. We are now back south in vicinity Doc, with C Troop just 1 km outside Doc to the west on the stream that ran through the rubber, and A Company another BD km farther west at the edge of the rubber. I remember that stream well, cold, clear -- a delight. It may not have been this day, but one time during Atlas Wedge I swam in that stream, reveled in it, changed clothes afterwards, and probably smelled less like a filthy pig than at any time since we had left Di An. I remember a lot of troopers doing the same. We carefully swept the area around it for mines and booby traps during the precious few times we could swim there, and we guarded it well. The 7th NVA Division would have had a hell of a fight on their hands had they tried to interfere with our use of that swimming hole.

Just before dark a LOH lands with my new PO's. The two ground unit RONs are within a couple kilometers of A/2-28, which sends in its first recorded sitrep vicinity Doc at 1955 hours. Apparently, although the company was under my command, their mission was to secure FSB Doc, and so I left them to that duty all day. At 2100, working no doubt by flashlight inside my command track, I seem to have been studying the map in relation to our mission, so I request an AO extension 1 km wide and 3 km long, north of FSB Doc. I do not recall why I thought this would be necessary. Fifty minutes later 11th ACR has approved the extension. (A note here - assignment of AO's was very important in the control of maneuver units and was carefully monitored by S-3s and the Division G-3 section. When an AO was shifted, often it had to be coordinated and approved by two or three adjacent battalion or usually higher [brigade, regiment, division] units. A commander had to know if friendlies were in or above his AO and exactly where they were in order to ensure troop safety when maneuvering his units and calling in supporting fires.) Fifty minutes later the AO extension is approved and we make arrangements to get a loach for me in the morning.During the day the log has recorded our efforts to get critical replacement parts flown out on the resupply choppers. Some of our vehicles are showing the effects of constant movement and minimal maintenance. No further activity is reported by 2400 and the log is closed.

In summary, late on the preceding day, under opcon to 11th ACR, we had taken over opcon of another infantry company whose mission seems to have been to secure FSB Doc; we had an all-night long series of small probes and movement around our RONs in the northern Michelin; and we conducted blocking and RIF operations throughout the day. We ceased RIFing rather early, and for once were not disturbed after dark in our RON positions just outside Doc. We resupplied and pulled some necessary maintenance, and we got hot chow and some rest.