"Bill Haponski" <haponski@seacove.net> was a former S3 and XO of the Blackhorse when he assumed command of the 1/4 Cav in the Spring of 1969.  He wrote: 


Atlas Wedge, Day 6, 23 March 1969

Correction on task organization for the preceding day. At 2134, 22 Mar our hq gets a call from Mules 55 that 2/28 AP is at XT612520, which puts it just outside FSB Doc. Then at 2205 Mule 55 reports A/2/28 neg sit rep until 2400. I wondered briefly about this when I saw these entries because A/2-28 had not been part of our task force. Why were we receiving the company
commander's sitrep? We were in the extreme northern part of the Michelin and A/2-28 was back at Doc.

Now as I look again at the log for 23 March there can be no doubt that sometime late on the preceding day we had picked up a second straight-leg infantry company. At 0029 the 23 Mar log records "C/1-4 A/2-28 A/1-28 Neg sit rep until 0501." Nothing further is entered about this company until evening sit reps when A/2-28 is still vicinity Doc. Our action all day long was in the northern part of the Michelin. I'm puzzled as to why we had an infantry company sitting under our control yet so far from that scene. Perhaps the next day's logs will clarify the situation.

You recall that I had requested firefly flights at programmed times during the night. We were in the area of 11 ACR's heaviest contacts during the preceding several days, and I wanted as much help as we could get in detecting any movement around our position. We could not get any flights until at 0130 Darkhorse 36 requests that we pop a flare so they can shoot an azimuth to our position. Presumably not wanting to draw any more attention to us than necessary I deny the request, figuring that sooner or later they will be able to find us on their own. Two minutes later 36 reports having trouble with his aircraft and is returning to base. (I cannot recall the details, but apparently the firefly missions were flown by two aircraft, one a gun ship for cover, and the other, I think a LOH or Huey - can't remember - with the searchlight.) We now work on arranging a replacement firefly mission

At 0230 TOC reports negative contact with 2-28 since 0153. Apparently this was resolved because we have no further log entries indicating trouble.

At 0255 Jim Selsor reports that C Troop is receiving sniper fire. My command section was RON'd with the troop, and in my 16 April journal entry I state: "One night as we moved to the extreme northern edge of the plantation, I could sense their presence. I knew that we would be hit that night, and we were. I awakened instantly, boots already on in anticipation, and saw the green tracers coming through our positions from the enemy weapons."

Jim requests light fire teams and says it was just a few sniper rounds and that he believes the VC were just trying to get into a fire fight with our elements. (This was one of their techniques, you recall, to stand off, shoot some rounds and duck into cover and watch as we returned fire, then pop up later with RPGs once they had identified our positions. Perhaps this is what they were up to, or maybe they just wanted to keep us awake. Given the types of action we subsequently experienced, it also may be that a fairly large unit was moving during the night and some of it engaged our RONs to screen the movement.) At 0259 I tell the TOC I will put Jim in charge of directing the air support. A few minutes later Jim reports that he has movement is west his ambush patrol that is out a short distance from the RON, and that he has received sniper rounds also from the north, and
that A/1-28 also received sniper fire. 

At 0308 we are told that the firefly is coming from Phu Loi and a light fire team from Lai Khe. Darkhorse 39, the LFT, soon arrives on station and I tell him that C55 will direct him. Twenty minutes later I report negative casualties to any C55 element. 

At 0352 the gun ship reports having made its first expenditure and requests Selsor to adjust fire. I tell the arty lno to crank up some H&I (harassment and interdiction rounds) after the light fire team expends. 

At 0359 the light fire team reports it received some small arms fire during one of its passes. 

At 0407 I tell the LFT to expend its load and I request a replacement firefly. (The one that was earlier reported coming from Phu
Loi seems to have been flying its mission during the engagement although no log entries reflect this.) A few minutes later I am told that none is available, that gun ships are scarce. When firefly has to leave station at 0410 I talk with someone in 11th ACR TOC and am assured they will do thei best to get us another firefly. We receive warning of a B-52 strike going into a box only 2 km south of Doc within the next hour, and probably smirk, thinking that should keep the 11th Cav guys at Doc awake so they can work on my request. 

At 0420 Selsor reports that his AP saw 3 VC moving west and another 2 VC trying to get between his RON and his AP. C Troop opens fire and receives small arms in return. At 0512 Selsor again reports movement between the RON and AP. An M79 (rifle grenade launcher) recons by fire, and a fire fight is in progress. Jim says they spot a few personnel running north and they are engaging with .50 cal and M60s (7.62mm machine guns). At 0524 Charlie Troop AP reports receiving a few rounds of AK from the east. In C Troop RON, Selsor reports more sightings to the north. He has one US slightly wounded, and the medic will take care of him. At 0542 Selsor has movement on the south side of his RON, and we get a call that 11th ACR is scrambling a light fire team for us. Fifteen minutes later I report to 11th ACR that A/1-28 is putting artillery in southeast and northeast of its AP. I give resupply instructions for back haul after daylight.. At 0615 Rebel 36 is on station and remains there for the next 25 minutes. As soon as it is light enough, our two units RIF around their nighttime positions. I get a call that the man who was hit last night was wounded by friendly M79 fire and he is back on duty. The results of the night's activities?

From my journal, 16 April:

"Our return fire was controlled due to the proximity of my units to one another, and the clash was short. Except for a blood trail, we had no evidence of having inflicted any damage, and, luckily, none was inflicted on us."

From Combat After Action Interview, 17th History, I say,:
"That night (after midnight on the 23rd) in our RON position we received about an estimated two squad probe and . . . there were negative casualties apparently on either side."

My LOH arrives at 0730 but has radio problems, naturally, and I'm told a second one should be there in 10-15 minutes. But at 0809 I'm told both loaches are down for maintenance. (By now have you guys figured out why my hair turned prematurely gray? I loved the loach when it was working right and only had to use it for visual reconnaissance or column control. And despite the maintenance problems we had, most often it was a highly dependable machine and difficult to knock down when hit. But a loach as a C & C ship during a contact was another matter, mostly because of its frequent radio problems.)

At 0852 Charlie Troop has a sighting of 10 VC and I direct our ground units to vicinity Violet. (Another coded location. Obviously we were using colors to designate them.) At 0912 my command TOC gets a call from D6: "Have CO stay on ground. He would like to talk to him," and a minute later 55L (one of the S-3 staff with me?) reports, "DG has landed/ talking to CO.".

D6, DG (typo for D6?, or acronym for Danger 6?). Who is he? Obviously a higher level commander, but not Patton who is Tyrant 6. Colonel Haldane, 3rd Bde CO? Probably not since we are no longer opcon to him. General Talbott? Could be. If so, when I earlier said I did not remember him visiting a field location except FSB Doc then my memory was faulty. I do recall talking to him sometimes when he was airborne over one of our contacts. Whoever it was, apparently the visit did nothing to change our mission which seems to have been to move to designated blocking positions and RIF around them. At 0930 an air cav scout reports seeing "new bunkers in Area Violet / they weren't there yesterday." The enemy in the Michelin was amazingly adept at constructing bunkers, then after they were destroyed, quickly reconstructing them when he wanted to. (Much more on this during my commentary on subsequent operations.)

At 1125 I want a correct set of Points of Origin to be sent out with the resupply choppers. (Some of you may recall that we got overlays designating certain N-S and E-W grid line intersections as Pos. Then we could give locations in reference to them rather than in the clear.) In the early afternoon we RIF in vicinity of the blocking positions and I direct hot chow and MO gas be brought out. We go into RON and AP positions early (around 1600) in order to resupply and eat, a treat, considering we were up all night with contacts. We are now back south in vicinity Doc, with C Troop just 1 km outside Doc to the west on the stream that ran through the rubber, and A Company another BD km farther west at the edge of the rubber. I remember that stream well, cold, clear -- a delight. It may not have been this day, but one time during Atlas Wedge I swam in that stream, reveled in it, changed clothes afterwards, and probably smelled less like a filthy pig than at any time since we had left Di An. I remember a lot of troopers doing the same. We carefully swept the area around it for mines and booby traps during the precious few times we could swim there, and we guarded it well. The 7th NVA Division would have had a hell of a fight on their hands had they tried to interfere with our use of that swimming hole.

Just before dark a LOH lands with my new PO's. The two ground unit RONs are within a couple kilometers of A/2-28, which sends in its first recorded sitrep vicinity Doc at 1955 hours. Apparently, although the company was under my command, their mission was to secure FSB Doc, and so I left them to that duty all day. At 2100, working no doubt by flashlight inside my command track, I seem to have been studying the map in relation to our mission, so I request an AO extension 1 km wide and 3 km long, north of FSB Doc. I do not recall why I thought this would be necessary. Fifty minutes later 11th ACR has approved the extension. (A note here - assignment of AO's was very important in the control of maneuver units and was carefully monitored by S-3s and the Division G-3 section. When an AO was shifted, often it had to be coordinated and approved by two or three adjacent battalion or usually higher [brigade, regiment, division] units. A commander had to know if friendlies were in or above his AO and exactly where they were in order to ensure troop safety when maneuvering his units and calling in supporting fires.) Fifty minutes later the AO extension is approved and we make arrangements to get a loach for me in the morning. During the day the log has recorded our efforts to get critical replacement parts flown out on the resupply choppers. Some of our vehicles are showing the effects of constant movement and minimal maintenance. No further activity is reported by 2400 and the log is closed.

In summary, late on the preceding day, under opcon to 11th ACR, we had taken over opcon of another infantry company whose mission seems to have been to secure FSB Doc; we had an all-night long series of small probes and movement around our RONs in the northern Michelin; and we conducted blocking and RIF operations throughout the day. We ceased RIFing rather early, and for once were not disturbed after dark in our RON positions just outside Doc. We resupplied and pulled some necessary maintenance, and we got hot chow and some rest.