"Bill Haponski" <haponski@seacove.net> was a former S3 and XO of the Blackhorse when he assumed command of the 1/4 Cav in the Spring of 1969.  He wrote: 


Atlas Wedge, Day 5, 22 March 1969

No change in task organization: C/1-4, A/1-28.

As the log opened at 0001 we were in two RON positions 3 to 4 km north of FSB Doc, which was occupied by 11th Armored Cav Regt. I was making arrangements for the Zippo service unit to be lifted out by Super Hook after daylight. The Area of Operations for 11th Cav changes during the night, and we are ordered to stay north of East-West Grid 53 (which translates to not moving south of our southernmost RON). At 0125 we get a new AO called to us for the next day's operations, and are told we will have a hunter-killer team opcon to us for BDA assessment. Also, if they have any significant findings, ARP'S will be employed to us. B/1-4 will be returning to Di An today opcon to 2nd Bde. Man (previously planned maneuver for the forthcoming day?) remains the same.

(Now I can assert that the "lost" B-Troop has indeed been found. Unknown to me up to this point in my reading of the logs, they had been "hiding out" under opcon to 1-28 Inf all along.)

At 0208 we get a "Heavy Artillery" warning. I now believe that these recurring warnings recorded in the logs in fact refer to B-52 strikes rather than 8" gun firing as I previously thought likely.

What little sleep we were able to get was interrupted at 0239 when a Spooky cuts loose and the rounds impact near us. At 0304 we are told by brigade that Spooky has no authorization, he just expended on his own. That knowledge did little to comfort us, I'm sure.

At 0601 we are told once again that B Troop will be returning to Di An, opcon to 2nd Bde. At 0700 I am told that a loach for me should be on station 0730 to 0800, coming out of Phu Loi, and a few minutes later am told that my hunter-killer team would be on station 0800 - 0830. My loach shows up 20 minutes later and at 0814 I report the Super Hook at our RON location.

Then the pace picks up dramatically. At 0836 I am told to meet with 11th ACR at 0845. Apparently I had ordered A/1-28 previously to sweep south the 2 km to C Troop's position, and at 0842 their company CO reports he is on the move. I must have been told something about a change of mission while I was still in the air headed for Doc because I tell the forward TOC, "Check
with 3rd Bde/see if can get B/1-4 opcon to us before he goes south."

At 0915 our TOC receives this message from S90 (probably 3rd Bde S-3): Opcon 11th ACR ASAP/upon moving out of 3rd Bde AO, report clearing of Bde AO.

I only vaguely recall meeting with Patton that day. It was the first time I had worked for him as a squadron commander. Across the years people have asked me about him. In my journal I recorded a good deal of our relationship and actions when I joined him as Assistant S-3, scheduled to become S-3 in a couple weeks, back in July '68. I could write volumes, and
intend to write at least one book in the next year or so which will relate to both my 11th ACR and 1/4 Cav experiences. But for now I'll sketch only a few highlights.

I first knew George S. Patton when I was in my second year at West Point, 1953-54, and he was assigned as our company tactical officer. (In those days cadets were assigned to companies by height so we'd look "right" when in formation. Needless to say, I was in the "runt" company of my regiment.)

None of us quite knew how to assess Patton, but we were proud to have the son of the famed tank commander as our TAC. The younger Patton had commanded a tank company in Korea and had been awarded a Silver Star. We were at one and the same time impressed and appalled by him. He was full of s- and vinegar, and was always on the move - prodding us, praising us,
cussing us. He was mercurial. One time he stopped a cadet from some other company when he saw that the man's shoulder seam of his dress gray coat had separated slightly. Patton was so incensed at this breach of dress code he put his finger in the seam and jerked violently downward, ripping the sleeve off the astonished cadet. Although I have no evidence and only rumor, I believe Patton got into deep trouble with his superiors over the incident. But he survived it. Throughout Academy and later years he most often was able to retain the loyalty of both subordinates and superiors despite his impetuous behavior. When I became a first classman (senior), Patton was instrumental in making me the battalion commander of one of the three battalions in the regiment.

When I arrived at the Repple Depot in July '68 my orders read USARV. Instead, the next day I found myself flying off to join Blackhorse. Patton, I later discovered, had been in USARV prior to his assuming command of 11th Cav just before I arrived. He had seen my orders and unknown to me had gotten my assignment changed. I was a major just about to get promoted, and
you can imagine how I felt, finding I was to become S-3 of the Cav instead of the most junior LTC in an office of a dozen or so more LTCs in the USARV warren of Long Binh.

While in the 11th Cav, occasionally my primary, but unstated and self-imposed mission was to keep Patton out of trouble. I won't go into that here. I had not seen him since cadet days. I soon found out two things about him. He wasn't dumb, as I had suspected sometimes when I was a cadet, and he inspired deep loyalty in most of those around him. By turns I would get aggravated and angry at him, but I always seemed to emerge admiring this strange creature. He knew what a cav regiment was all about, and despite his often careless handling of himself and sometimes those around him, he got things done. He deeply loved his troopers, and he felt their losses terribly.

After I had been with him a few months he surprised me one day by bringing up the issue of command. He said he would like to give me one of his squadrons but could not because he had already committed them to others. He said if I would extend he would give me the first one to become available. Later he told me a Mech Battalion in 1st Division had opened up. For a week
or so it appeared I was going to get it. Then I heard I was instead to be 1/4 Cav commander. For Patton's role in my choice as Quarterhorse 6 -- and I assume he had a role -- I will be eternally grateful. You troopers were the greatest.

Perhaps three years after we had both returned from Vietnam, and he was CG of the Armor School, he asked me to be his directory of instruction. For personal reasons I did not accept, and have often regretted that I could not have taken the assignment and gone on with my military career. Despite his failings, and he had many, I feel a strong sense of friendship and loyalty to him. He was a man of integrity, intelligence, and unbelievable energy. For several years we kept in touch. Then it became letters and cards at Christmas. Now the only contact with him is through JoAnne, his wife, who is able to get through to him on his "good" days. For the last several years he has been debilitated by disease, and although he is only 76, in the last Christmas picture he looks 106.

He was a good soldier.

By 1000 my meeting with Patton appears to be over and I have my mission from him. I order C Troop and A Company to break operations and instead head for FSB Doc.

At 1025 Brigade calls us and says, "1/4 became opcon to 11th ACR/Check but of 3rd Bde net at 1026." At 1100 a log entry confirms that we have checked into "Tyrant's" net, the call sign for 11th Armored Cav Regt. I probably grinned a bit at Patton's call sign. C Troop and A Company must have moved out smartly down Rt 239 because they have already arrived , received their
orders from me, and at 1243 have SP'd Doc on a new mission: the Michelin. For the first time we enter the rubber itself.

By 1250 the two units and headquarters command section are already three km into the rubber due west of Doc, and I am perhaps overhead in the loach. I cannot recall our mission but infer from later reports it was to sweep north
through the rubber. The swiftness of the movement indicates we were reacting to hot intelligence, and my reading of the after-action report seems to confirm this. At 1251 I tell the TOC to relay, "No hot chow on resupply tonight."

At 1325 Jim Selsor reports, Location TF Haponski 579549," which is only about 2 km further north, indicating we were probably on line, sweeping rather than in column. I must have called for an AVLB to join us from Doc because at 1428 it has SPd Doc "for stream site." Shortly we find enemy bodies from previous actions, and a few minutes later, at the same location
we have contact. From here, I'll let the log entries do most of the talking. Selsor reports:

1455 C55; Have 2 VC; Got 1 VC KIA and 1 VC WIA CO 11th Cav will pick up PW same location (This entry leads me to
believe I was not overhead at this time, but rather in the rubber riding my command track. Had I had a LOH I would have landed and taken the wounded NVA back to Doc myself. Always in the 11th Cav urgent priority was given to quick interrogation of prisoners immediately upon capture at the site of engagement, and then immediate dustoff to the TOC where the attached
Prisoner of War Interrogation Team took over.)

1515 90; 1 VC was dusted off, 1 VC was KIA
1535 55; Resupply at 571555 ASAP (near the contact)
1550 55; Correction on contact sit rep - coord 566555. Found 3 dead bodies killed by air strike - sighted and engaged 2 VC. 1 VC WIA dusted off by Tyrant 6 other was KIA - recov. 4 AK47, 2 in good condition, 2 in poor con. 1 RPG-2 and 5 RPG-2 rounds, documents which were extracted with PW. Part of C/1-4 securing area for resupply. A/1-28 RIFing locally and the
remaining element of C/1-4 proceeding to village 554552 that PW mentioned. (This would have been one of the many small, numbered hamlets of only a few houses that were inside the Michelin. The maps of the time labeled them Ap 1, Ap 2, etc.) Having been well trained in the value of hot intelligence in the 11th ACR, and well aware of the paucity of such intelligence in our Di An operations, I probably was spurring Jim Selsor on to check out the PWs report.

At 1655 Patton calls me, "Have 2 downed LOH 579538." This is 3 km southeast of us inside the rubber. One minute later I report, "Moving a column to that location for security." (Friendlies in trouble took priority over any other operation.) Seven minutes later the 11th ACR TOC reports that the LOH is secure (by us or 11th ACR's Air Cav Troop? It is unclear. Probably Air Cav because even with us racing through the trees, I doubt we would have covered 3km in 6 minutes, fast though we always were.) Then three minutes after that report I get a call from 11th ACR TOC, "Have another LOH down 587562," and 5 minutes later I report, "Moving another column to that location. Due to time, request ARP's." (This new location is in the opposite direction from the previous downed LOH. Again, I believe I must have been on the ground, otherwise I would have flown to the site only 2 km away and tried to provide as much security as possible until arrival of ground troops or ARPs.)

1729 55; Have 3 VC sighted at 570538, moving west. Request LFT
1734 R29; LFT on station
1755 90; Down LOH to the south has flown away
1759 90; Tyrant 6 will pick up downed LOH pilots at FSB Doc. (In the 11th Cav Patton or I or anyone else overhead often landed to pick up injured troopers before dustoff could get there. Perhaps these pilots were injured, or perhaps he had other reasons for picking them up. It was not unusual for him.)

At 1915 I report closing on Rose now. Presumably Rose was the name given as an objective for our day's operation. The RON positions we later report are at the very northern edge of the Michelin, about 6 km from Doc, and this location probably was Rose.

1925 11 Cav; Readout on PW; From C25 Scalper CO (probably the head of 11th ACRs attached POW interrogation team ); 320th, 7th NVA. (320th Regiment of the 7th NVA Division). POW states 40 men in his unit. His unit made contact with elements of 25th Division (U.S., also involved in Atlas Wedge south and west of the Michelin) at 1001 / XT571528 today. Five VC were KIA. POW fled when (until) captured by C/1-4. Has neg knowledge of units location.

Just at dusk, in our RON, an H & I round impacts close to us. I don't remember, but I probably requested that the artillery have a little more consideration. We've done a decent day's work.

At 2120 I ask for a "firefly" to run north and east of the Plantation at specified times during the night. As I recall, a firefly was a
hunter-killer team equipped with searchlights which they would turn on and then off, resembling the flight of a firefly on a hot summer night back home. Perhaps it was just one gun ship. I don't remember clearly. Their mission, of course, was to detect any movement near us. Before midnight in our RON we get a confirmation on our firefly request and our LOH request for the morning, as well as a Heavy Artillery warning.

Thus ends our first day in the rubber.

I find these relevant statements in 17th History's After-Action Interview Report:

"Throughout the period of the operation the 209th Regt was identified through contacts and by PWs. . . . Source said the 209th Regt moved from Cambodia on 8 Mar and arrived at the present location on 15 Mar. Source stated the Regt was to stay in the Michelin 'at all costs.'"

"On 22 Mar TF 1-28 was moved overland from field positions to FSPB Picardy. TF 1-4 continued search operations vic XT6154 and was transferred to OPCON of 11th ACR for continued operations in the Michelin."

Thus we can be reasonably certain that at the time Charlie Troop was in the northern Michelin, Bravo Troop was not too far away, somewhere near Picardy, about 5 km distant from Doc. Tonight I visited with Terry Valentine and he assured me that at that time, he and the rest of his A Troop platoon were taking hot showers at the Water Plant. Nice guy.

In my journal entry of 16 April I have this to say about activities on the 22nd:

"Then, beginning on the 22d, we went into the Michelin, green carpeted in appearance from the air. Only occasional bomb craters had twisted and blasted some of the trees to destroy its beauty. Some tanks, abandoned after being destroyed, remained to mark the previous battles of the 11th Cavalry a few days before. Down in the rubber we moved, feeling our way in
a new environment. Over four hundred enemy had been killed a few days before in these trees. We knew when we came close to the scene of the contacts, strangely unmarked by ripped trees and earth, because we could smell the dead. Now and then we would find fresh graves. The enemy was there, but not in force now. New bunkers by the hundreds had been built. A sharp clash resulted in one NVA killed, one captured. They had been separated from their unit and were hiding in a culvert a few meters from the decaying bodies of their comrades killed a few days prior to this. Later we engaged small groups as they fled, and then found what they were hiding, a large cache of rice and munitions."