"Bill Haponski" <haponski@seacove.net> was a former S3 and XO of the Blackhorse when he assumed command of the 1/4 Cav in the Spring of 1969.  He wrote: 

Atlas Wedge, Day 4, 21 March 1969

Fire Support Base Doc was a temporary FSB established by 11th ACR for the duration of Atlas Wedge, and apparently was named after Major Doc Bahnsen, the regiment's air cav troop commander. His troop made the first contact in the Michelin on the day before Atlas Wedge while reconning from the air. The result was 30 NVA body count, and 15 possible.

After midnight, RON'd just outside Doc, we try to get a LOH for me at first light. The entries reflect the problem: We are assured we have first priority. Somewhat later a LOH is denied. Later yet we are told I'll get one but definitely not at first light. At 0300 I seem to have told someone at higher headquarters our units would not move without a LOH. I have no idea why I was so adamant, except that when we later move out we're headed away from Doc, up Route 239, one of those lonely roads that had spelled big trouble in the past during the few times any US units had ventured on it.

At 0715 I report that one of the listening posts last night heard movement and didn't report it. This morning 2 of the claymores had the blasting caps snipped and removed.

This next entry confirms that we did have D (Air) under our control for the preceding three days. I am 55.

0720 55; Tell XO to check with 3rd Bde & ACC to find out why Darkhorse isn't opcon to us any more. ( I realize now that I come to this entry that I had been even busier than I thought, providing air cav support to the two infantry battalions in 3rd Brigade as well as to our own task force. I do not recall what answer I received. Probably, "Division needs them back."

Apparently somebody at brigade believed me about the LOH because at 0735 we are moving north east, starting at FSB Doc on the edge of the Michelin, moving between jungle on our right and left, gradually leaving the edge of the rubber farther and farther to the west of us. Our mission was as follows, according to a call from 3rd Brigade at 0920: Proceed north, northeast XT6259 conduct search operations along trails and open areas. Be prepared on 2 hrs. notice to return to present field location to reinforce ACR XT5957. 11 ACR had contact last night est. plt. VC force lost 2 tanks, 11 WIA US type. Presently in contact with unknown force 1/4 mission is to reinforce 11 ACR.

Our destination at XT6259 would have put us in dense jungle 4 km northeast of the 11 ACR contact area. To get there we would have had to travel up Route 239 6km, break jungle for another 4 km, and at that point be prepared to reinforce ACR within 2 hours. That meant we would have to break another 4 km of jungle to get to them. If we were capable of accomplishing that we surely should get a Presidential Unit Citation even if a shot were never fired. The impossibility of the mission apparently prompted me to contact 3rd Brigade, and at 0957, Colonel Haldane landed to talk with me. Bob Haldane, an infantryman, was one fine soldier. He was always on top of things, and I had the utmost confidence in him. He listened well, gave clear instructions, and left me alone to carry them out, supporting us with brigade and division resources as necessary. (He retired as a major
general, proving that sometimes the good guys win.)

At 1212 both C Troop and A/1-28 are 4 km north at the unnamed hamlet. Apparently Haldane had agreed with me that if we went north to the original objective we would never be able to reinforce 11 ACR. So we stop at the hamlet, then turn due west to break jungle toward the Michelin some 4 km distant, making it possible for us to reinforce 11 ACR 2km to the north. I order resupply near the hamlet for 1545 hours, 5 sorties.

At 1310 one of my staff (S-3?) calls instructions to Di An TOC , "Have S-1 send 2 wheeled Zippo service units to Lai Khe by first available convoy and notify us when they SP."  I am not sure about the status of the flamethrower tracks themselves. I presume they must have been with us but have seen no reference to them in the logs.

At 1600 I ask brigade to send me a replacement loach; mine will have to return to Phu Loi for maintenance, and brigade soon gets one on the way (which seems to reflect the importance placed on our mission).

By 1742 our last resupply sortie is on the way. Apparently 11 ACR earlier reported it no longer needed us as a contingency reinforcement because we seem to have backed out of the jungle for resupply at the hamlet. Our TOC tells 3rd Bde that I no longer want a LOH that night but want it at first light.

At 1855, just about at dark, Jim Selsor, C55, reports he has contact. The next several log entries tersely record the series of events. My clarifications are in parenthesis. I am 55, operating from my command track. Rebel is call sign for D (Air). .

1859 55; Request Hunter Killer team 635560 (Route 239 at northern edge of hamlet)1904 3rd Bde will have light fire team ETA 10 - 15
1914 55; Coord of contact XT625543. 1 VC moving E
1914 3rd Bde; D-38 will be on station in 10 minutes (Perhaps one of their artillery liaison officers, or maybe one of Darkhorse's platoon or section leaders. By this time I would probably have had artillery impacting.)
1918 55; C/1-4 element in pursuit. Received 1 RPG (The pursuit by the troop and my command section took us into the jungle.)
1924 D39; D39 on station (Must have taken D38's place) 1930 55; Receiving heavy Auto. fire from the east
1935 R36; Rebel 36 on station, D31 leaving station (D31 is probably one of the platoon or section leaders of Darkhorse who had arrived to look things over.)
1944 55; Lifting arty so gunship can expend. Request Spooky. (Spooky was the name for the Air Force's propeller-driven planes equipped for night missions. As I recall they were old C46's, left over from WWII and Korea, but I'll check. I believe that at least one was in the air ready for mission on call every night in II Field Force area, and it could arrive at a given location in a few minutes. Spooky was equipped with Gatlin guns or sometimes higher caliber weapons and carried a large supply of illumination flares. When those guns fired it was a sight like 4th of July, only in reverse, with the tracers shooting down instead of up. Coordination of artillery, gun ship, fighter-bomber, or Spooky supporting fires while maneuvering a ground element required close reporting by all units and attention to location. Actually the principle was reasonably easy. The guns would fire out of a fire support base, in this case quite certainly Doc just to the south, and Picardy, another temporary FSB further southeast. In
directing fires you just had to keep aircraft on an elliptical orbit on one side or the other of the gun-target line (pilots were careful to help you out in that regard, needless to say, not wanting to encounter one of the shells en route.) You kept the artillery coming in until you wanted gun ships or other aircraft to attack, and then lifted the artillery just before they went on their final target run. After they made one or more passes, you could bring on the artillery again and go through the same routine, or in daylight you could do v
reconnaissance for results.) 

1950 55; estimated 2 squads of enemy
1950 R36; Rebel 36 making second pass
1954 3rd Bde; Spooky ETA 15. Spooky 73
2014 55; Request another light fire team to remain in place. Receiving more RPGs and auto
2016 55; Check fire Arty. Spooky 73 on station
2025 55; Cancel request for LFT 
2035 S73; Expending at this time
2140 S73 has 20 minutes of illumination left 
2132 S73: Spooky has about 10 minutes of illum left (This entry and several following are obviously incorrect in terms of reported time, but seem sequentially correct.)
2134 S73; Spotted secondary explosions at 630535 (about 1 km or so from initial contact, indicating our movement to the southeast in pursuit.)
2136 C55 (Selsor wraps up his reporting with a summary of locations and says they received small arms, 3 RPGs and machine gun fire.)
2138 S73; Will expend for last time in same area
2142 S73; Spooky has about 5 min. left on station. (You can be sure we always thanked Spooky profusely at the conclusion of a mission.)
2220 71 Called in negative body count but C/1-4 will sweep again in the morning

2330 55; C/1-4 RON XT625535 C/1-4 AP XT618532. ( C Troop calls it a day and a night at the scene of the last contact. They put out an ambush patrol and let a few troopers get some rest while others remain alert. My command section quite certainly RON'd with C Troop. A/1-28 RONs near the hamlet to the north.)

On 8 April I was interviewed by the 17th Military History Detachment in an after-action report on Atlas Wedge. I had this to say:

>From 18 through 21 March we conducted jungle busting operations in the vicinity of the Michelin, both to the east of it and to the south and east of it. During this period we found some evidence of recent traffic, and we had one fairly sharp clash. Charlie Company, 1-4 Cav, Hq element, 1st Squadron, 4th Cav, on 21 March contacted an estimated 2 NVA squads (several
words illegible) and the circumstances were such that we could not maneuver effectively against them. We had negative results on either side from (illegible).

My journal entry of 16 April reflects the events of the 21st:

One night we ran into a small group of enemy who fired RPG's and small arms at us. I did not see them but received their fire. Dark fell, and the gun ships I called in made red streams of light come from the sky as they sprayed the area only a few meters ahead of us with their miniguns and rockets. There were no casualties, on our side at least. The troop and my
headquarters section had made its first contact.