"Bill Haponski" <haponski@seacove.net> was a former S3 and XO ofthe Blackhorse when he assumed command of the 1/4 Cav in the Spring of 1969.  He wrote: 

Atlas Wedge, Day 3, 20 March 1969

Task organization remains unchanged: C/1-4, D/1-4 (Air), A/1-28 Inf. With a change in S-3 radio operator on the evening of the preceding day, the logs for the 20th and the next few days often are difficult to interpret, and important items seem to have been omitted. Nevertheless, the logs convey the overall picture.

During the night of 19/20 March, both ground units and the command section are RONing in two positions just south of Boundary Road about 9 km east of the Michelin. At 0300 hours on the 20th Heavy Artillery impacts into a grid just across the road, within one kilometer. I am unsure if "Heavy Artillery" is another transparent code name for a B-52 strike, or if it refers to 8" guns firing out of Lai Khe. I think the latter since I doubt that a B-52 strike would have been programmed so close to a ground unit. In any event, the ground would have rumbled a good deal near us as we tried to catch some sleep.

Darkhorse (D Air) makes commo checks with us throughout the night, indicating that they are probably still under my control. At 0714 I am instructed that I have to get a LOH from Darkhorse resources - Division will not provide one for me. At some point I will give you some information on Division's withdrawal of D (Air) from 1-4 Cav control, but for now I will just sketch highlights. I recently queried Jack Faith, my predecessor, to confirm that Division had withheld Darkhorse from him except for a Darkhorse
Huey which was fitted out as his command and control ship. When I took command I had the C & C for only a few days before they took it too, requiring this cav squadron commander who, by TO & E had 27 helicopters, to request (sometimes badger) Division for a LOH when I needed it. A LOH under the best of circumstances was a poor substitute for a proper C & C ship with its banks of radios and room for the artillery liaison officer, a staff officer or two, and sometimes an Air Force forward air controller. The LOHs that Division had in its aviation battalion often were poorly maintained, especially the radios. Needless to say, I must have been aggravated that now, during Atlas Wedge, I could not even get one of these machines but would have to pull a scout ship away from Darkhorse. I must have expected to argue Division out of a LOH and so took the precaution a
minute later at 0714 to put out a call and get a reply that "9" (Perhaps the commo platoon leader) "Has PRC 25 / will bring this loc ASAP." The PRC 25, you may recall, was a pack radio of decent range and dependability. I often had to use it in the LOH because of malfunctioning LOH radio/intercom. I directed operations during some contacts using only this radio, switching
back and forth between squadron and brigade or division frequencies, and yelling fire support instructions over the noise from the open doors to Ray Naclerio, our arty lno, who had his own PRC 25 in the back seat. We got by, but it wasn't easy.

At 0740 the ground units are moving for the day's mission, which, in the lack of any subsequent entries, I infer to be a RIF along Boundary Road, headed west to the Michelin since that's where we ended at nightfall.

Next in the log we have two curious entries, and I ask for help anyone can give me in interpreting them.

0750 86 Request someone to pickup AL9 and bring to this location

0800 AL9 Mobile bunker for general / enroute this location for CG

????? Did General Talbott have a mobile bunker which was airlifted to a field location for his use? And why would we get such a request when we are on Boundary Road in the boonies? He surely had no intention of staying there with us. In fact, on the morning of 28 March when he landed at Fire Support Base Doc to see me after the NVA attack of the night before, and some mortar rounds landed in the distance, he ran back to his helicopter and took off. He did not go to any bunker, mobile or otherwise. I do not recall seeing General Talbott during combat operations in 11th ACR or 1-4 Cav except for this visit. I believe I only met him at base camp or Vietnamese social occasions or ceremonies. I just can't figure this one out.
A mobile bunker?????

During the morning, I get a LOH from somewhere, and a D (Air) hunter-killer team and I do bomb damage assessments in the area from B-52 strikes during the night. We find no damage other than to terrain.

At 1107 chow is confirmed for both units (good news - hot chow at last). At 1201 my LOH has maintenance and commo problems (naturally), and I request one ASAP from 3d Brigade. At 1405 I ask ARPs and a hunter killer team to do a BDA for a block in the jungle 2 km east of the northern edge of the Michelin. This strike has hit several bunkers, and there is evidence of light foot traffic.

At 1616 a hunter-killer scout ship receives fire from 5 different locations about 20 km south of Boundary Road, a long way from our ground units. (Another indication that some if not all of D (Air) was under our control.) Darkhorse expends in the area and reports 5 VC KIA (possible). (Throughout Atlas Wedge we report VC body count when in fact we mean NVA. The only VC
were small specialty units and base camp caretaker teams. We were in fact fighting a good portion of the 7th NVA Division.)

Here is another entry which someone might be able to explain:

1730 B44 Devalle - 1625 - XT594495 - injuries to lower st leg. 50 cal maint swing and crushed leg. Possible fracture and cut knee. Evacuated to Daw Lieng.

I take it to mean that at 1625 hours at that location (a village about 4 km southeast of FSB Doc at the very edge of the Michelin), B44 was reporting that Devalle hurt his right lower leg and was evacuated to Dau Tieng, a 25th Inf Div base several km to the southwest of our operations. Our ground troops were not within several km of the accident. And who is B44? Our Bravo troop was not with us at the time.

At 1900 both ground units report RON just outside the northern portion of Fire Support Base Doc, the fire base established by 11th ACR a few days earlier, now occupied by them, and soon to become our responsibility. Perhaps this is why we were moved to the vicinity of Doc. I don't recall.

Nothing happens to 2400 when the log is closed. In summary, during this third day of operations I was busy with bomb damage assessment from the air while the ground units moved from their previous night's RONs along Boundary Road to FSB Doc. We had no contacts.

A note on 11th ACR: They moved into the Michelin on the first day of Atlas Wedge and had several sharp engagements on the 18th and 19th, resulting in significant body count, but also several KIA and tank and ACAV combat losses. During this time we were operating to their east. On the 20th, this day in which we had no contact, they had a heavy engagement about 1km off the northern edge of the rubber into the jungle, about 5 km north of us. As I recall, the total body count in the Michelin area for 11 ACR to this point was around 300. We were now camping on their doorstep. Soon we were to become opcon to them for a couple days, and then they would leave the Michelin all to us.