"Bill Haponski" <haponski@seacove.net> was a former S3 and XO ofthe Blackhorse when he assumed command of the 1/4 Cav in the Spring of 1969.  He wrote: 

Guys, on this date, thirty-two years later, I look at the newly recovered S-3 logs and at my journal, written at the time. The events are so significant in the history of 1/4 Cav, and in the lives of all of us, I thought you might be interested in a brief look at what we did..

I have extracted only a few entries from over 300 in the logs for three days. In between these entries, oftentimes reports were coming in from platoons and troops, and instructions were going out from headquarters.

You who were there may remember the situation. For months in late 1968 and early 1969, 1/4 Cav's mission was primarily twofold: continue to act as ready reaction force for the Saigon area, and conduct pacification throughout Di An district and an adjoining portion of Lai Thieu district. Basically what you troopers were doing was what I referred to at the time as "poking around back yards with sticks," hoping to find a VC now and then. And we did. At the same time, important civic action efforts were underway throughout the district, and safe daylight travel became commonplace for us and the Vietnamese population.

Even before I assumed command in early January 1969 I lobbied to get Division to change 1/4 Cav's mission. Important as it was, I tried to impress upon them that this was not the best use of their most potent fighting force. Remember, we had much more firepower and mobility than any other divisional unit. We were the Cav.

My entreaties seemed to fall on deaf ears until 16 March when USARV ordered operation Atlas Wedge, a major attack into the Trapezoid, Michelin, and surrounding areas north of Di An and west of division headquarters in Lai Khe. From that moment on, Division took a different view of us.

The explanations below, in parentheses, are mine. Misspellings are not corrected. I'm not certain I have interpreted all entries accurately, but I'm probably fairly close to the truth. 

From S-3 log, 16 March 1969:
0806 16; Off Dagger enroute L.K. (0806 hours) (I am Items 16, our call sign at the time. Dagger is 2nd Brigade to whom we were opcon in Di An. L.K. is Lai Khe. I believe this is my first indication that something is up. Usually I took orders from Colonel Carley, 2nd Brigade Commander in Di An, and did not often go to Lai Khe.).

0820 16; Landing Red Ball (Code name for helipad, Lai Khe) (All the division major staff is there in the briefing bunker, and all brigade and battalion level commanders plus key support staff are present. 11th ACR commander, Colonel George Patton, and his key staff are there, and I chat briefly with them, having been S-3 and XO of 11th Cav prior to my command of 1/4 Cav. MG Talbott, division commander, talks after the staff briefings. The attack is scheduled for 19 March. 1/4 Cav is to be a key element in the move north from Di An into the Trapezoid and in the attacks beyond.)

1000 16: Off L.K. enroute D.A. (Shortly after I land I refine plans I had formulated en route, and meet with 1/4 Cav commanders and staff.) Platoons are scattered all over our A.O., and continue their regular missions, as reflected in the logs.)

2157 Outlaw 11; Outlaw 11 3rd Bde Items 16 CO to meet him at 0930 at L.K.
(Outlaw 11 is Colonel Robert Haldane, 3rd Brigade Commander, to whom I wasto report during the early days of Atlas Wedge. Later we were also opcon to11th ACR, but usually operated as an independent task force reporting directly to Division.)

2204 57: LOH request 0915 (Light Observation Helicopter requested for the next morning. Most of the time I rode my command track, but for major movements and contacts I tried to get a LOH to fly out from Division. The LOH was most inadequate as a command and control ship, but it was all I could get.)

(In the meantime, life for the bulk of you troopers was going on as usual. We tried not to do things that would tip off the operation. I'll speak much more on our failures in that regard when I get time to address them.)

From S-3 log, 17 March 1969
0031 2nd Bde; Scramble alert plt. To move to west gate and sweep north along berm, sighting vic XT895078  (We always had a platoon on alert in base camp for quick response. This night it was 3d platoon, Alpha Troop. We were trying to get ready to move, yet conduct regular operations. Many of us did not get much sleep.)
.
0037 A74; 3/A/1-4 moving towards W.G. (A74 is probably the XO or 1st Sgt. W.G. is West Gate, Di An base camp.)

0046 I16; Move to west gate use by pass and sweep north. VC siting was at WW corner of DA 0051 AN6; 3/A/1-4 SP W/G. (Starting point passed at West Gate. Slow. I probably chewed out the poor platoon leader, Alpha November, who no doubt
had been cursing at the MPs to get the &%##!! gate open.) 0055 I16; 3/A/1-4 don't go pass grid 07 line, 81 mm is impacting just past it.

0113 AN6; 3/A/1-4 has one stuck vehicle, leave two for security and continue on
0115 AN6; 3/A/1-4 illumination is out
0124 AN6; 3/A/1-4 are right in the area of spotting
0135 57; LOH 0900 tomorrow
0154 AN6; 3/A/1-4 approaching N.G.
0156 AL9; 3/A/1-4 neg sitrep
0202 AN6; 3/A/1-4 closed N.G. all wpns clr (North Gate, weapons clear)
0909 I16; Off Dagger enroute L.K.
0910 I16; Request S-3 to check opns of 5th ARVN on our western border (At this division meeting in Lai Khe I believe we learned that security had been compromised and the operation was moved forward one day to 18 March. Time was short to move a cav squadron, so en route back to Di An I called for a meeting.)
1121 16; Request Staff meeting 1230
1340 58; Request LOH 1530 (I believe I had planned a visual reconnaissance of our attack route for earlier that morning, but had to use the LOH to go to Lai Khe instead. Now I wanted to get a look. I knew much of the close-in area from past VRs, but our new mission took us well beyond what I was familiar with.).
1419 Dagger; LOH approved 1600
1440 88V; Jump CP enroute L.K. (I got our forward CP moving to Lai Khe, minus my command track, probably. Di An would be too far from our area of operations for other than logistical support.)
1640 16; Off Dagger pad
1650 88; Request LOH for 0800 18 Mar 69 (No doubt this was for the early stages of column control for the next morning.)
1820 I16; Off L.K. enroute D.A. request trans.
2038 86; Forward TOC neg sitrep (The entry for the forward TOC closing Lai Khe is missing.)
2119 57; Request LOH 0655 (This may have been because our SP time from Di An got moved up.)
2200 2nd Bde; Change to new SOI (New Signal Operating Instructions went into effect, and all of us went crazy as usual trying to get used to it.)
2201 57; Change to new SOI
2325 39; Commo officer Commo check from L.K. LC (The commo officer was Walt Kurtz. The forward TOC at Lai Khe and the main TOC still in Di An were getting commo checks from all units, reporing LC, loud and clear.) 2346 Forward TOC; Pass to B Trp that there will be a guide at the Ben Cat bypass when he reaches there

The following is an entry from my journal for 17 Mar 69, obviously written late in the evening and in haste.
Tomorrow we go into the dense jungle in search of the enemy. It will be difficult, crashing through with tanks. Supposedly the 7th NVA Division and the 34th Artillery Group are in there. Today as we flew low over the area I could see some evidence of heavy traffic. It will be no picnic. I trust that I will bring out as many as I take in.

From S-3 log, 18 March 1969
(The log is soaked with liquid and almost illegible in some places. Apparently we went on radio silence immediately after the following entry, since the next long sequence of entries indicates timed "squelch breaks" rather than verbal reports.

0008 39; Commo officer 86 forward TOC has negative contact with us. If we have any messages for him send them thru 39 CR
0630 64; Commo check LC (Apparently we came off radio silence, and were probably moving out. No entries are recorded thereafter until the one below. What happened? Was the S-3 track so busy, or on the move, that entries were written on a pad for later entry, but never got entered? Did someone spill something all over the logs for this day? A letter to my wife on 16 March indicated we got rain for the first time in a long time, the start of the monsoon season, so maybe the logs got soaked from the rain. At any rate, with the next entry, we can see we were well into the mission.)

1110 C44; C/L/6 location 770485 C/HQ XT 785483 A/28 same location as C/HQ (Charlie troop reports its location. I will soon start work on a database showing who was opcon to whom, and where, and at what time. Obviously Company A, 28th Infantry battalion initially was part of our task force.)

1135 55; Beginning jungle busting move North now (I was now 55 something or other, a result of change of SOI. We were on our way into Atlas Wedge. Henceforth we would be constantly moving or fighting or both. We would not return to Di An during the remainder of my four months in command, and, I think ever after except for standdown in 1970. From 18 March on, I had no
time for journal entries or picture taking or eating or other things I used to enjoy occasionally. My R & R had been scheduled for late March, but was postponed several times due to operations. I finally went later in April. Below is a small portion of my journal entry made the day I left the field for Hong Kong.)

Notebook, 16 Apr 69
Since I made my last annotation [a month earlier], life has been ripped apart and put back together several times. The scars are still fresh.

We started on the 18th with jungle busting, a frustrating experience of heat, insects, dust until everyone is miserably begrimed, and equipment failures. The troops were new to the environment, and many innovations were necessary before they settled down.

(I continue with several pages of description of Atlas Wedge which I will share with you later. I get that same old kick in the gut when I read my 17 March entry, "I trust I will bring out as many as I take in." This was not to be. They were fine young men, and we owe it to them to tell their story, our story, as best we can.)